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WHAT INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES DOES THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT NEED TO
SUCCEED?: A GRAVITY-BASED APPROACH
STUART FORD
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing debate about what resources the International
Criminal Court (ICC) needs to be successful.1 On one side of this debate
are many of the Court’s largest funders, including France, Germany,
Britain, Italy, and Japan.2 They have repeatedly opposed efforts to
increase the Court’s resources even as its workload has increased
dramatically in recent years.3 On the other side of the debate is the Court
itself and many of the Court’s supporters within civil society.4 They have
taken the position that it is underfunded and does not have sufficient
resources to succeed.5 This debate has persisted for years and
disagreements over the ICC’s funding level are now a central feature of
the Court’s budgeting process.6

* Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. This
Article was greatly improved by the comments of Professors William Mock and Margaret Ryznar.
Matts Hermans also provided valuable feedback. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. See generally Stuart Ford, How Much Money Does the ICC Need?, in THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten Stahn ed., 2015).
2. Id. at 90.
3. Id. See also Elizabeth Evenson, The ICC: Too Important to Let Fail, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/07/icc-too-important-let-fail.
4. See Ford, supra note 1, at 89–92.
5. Id.
6. See Ford, supra note 1, at 92–94 (noting that the Assembly of State Parties ultimately
increased the ICC’s budget for 2013 despite those countries advocating for a zero growth policy, but
that the increase was still less than the ICC had asked for). Essentially the same thing happened in
2014. See Lilian Ochieng & Simon Jennings, ICC Secures Budget Increase, INSTITUTE FOR WAR &
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As this long-running debate demonstrates, reaching an agreement on
the level of resources the ICC needs is very difficult. This Article
contributes to that debate by using an empirical gravity-based approach to
understand what investigative resources the ICC needs to succeed. This is
an important part of the overall question of what resources the Court needs
because the investigations are a critical and sizable component of the
ICC’s work. First, the investigations are critical because successful
investigations are a necessary predicate to the trials that are the principal
7
work of the ICC. Second, the investigations are a sizable part of the
Court’s work because they are very resource intensive.8 Thus,
understanding what resources the ICC needs to complete successful
investigations is important in determining what resources the Court needs
as a whole.
This Article assesses the ICC’s needs by looking at the investigative
resources that states assign to domestic mass atrocity crimes and then
9
comparing them to the investigative resources available to the ICC. One
would expect that similar crimes would require similar resources to
investigate. Thus, the resources devoted to domestic atrocity crime
investigations can shed light on what resources the ICC needs to be
successful. If the ICC has similar resources to those devoted to domestic
mass atrocity investigations, this suggests that the ICC is adequately
resourced. If, on the other hand, the ICC has fewer resources to conduct its
investigations than domestic systems use in comparable circumstances,
this suggests that the ICC is under-resourced.
PEACE REPORTING (Jan. 20, 2014), https://iwpr.net/global-voices/icc-secures-budget-increase. The
same thing is set to occur in 2016 as well. See Coalition for the ICC, ASP 14: Negotiating the 2016
ICC Budget (Nov. 13, 2015), https://ciccglobaljustice.wordpress.com/2015/11/13/asp14-the-courtsbudget-for-2016-tackling-iccs-capacity-crisis/ (noting that the ASP’s Committee on Budget and
Finance has recommended a budget increase over 2015 but one that is smaller than the Court has
requested).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 138–39.
8. For example, according to the 2016 budget, the OTP has a total of 218 personnel. See
Assembly of State Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2016 of the International Criminal Court,
doc. no. ICC-ASP/14/10 (Sept. 2, 2015), tbl.20. Of those 218 personnel, almost half—103—work in
the Investigation Division. See id. tbl.32. For comparison purposes, the Prosecution Division only has
45 personnel. Id. tbl.35. Thus, the investigations require nearly half of the OTP’s total personnel and
more than twice as many personnel as the trials.
9. In many ways, this Article can be seen as complementary to an earlier article, Complexity
and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, which measured the relative efficiency of the trials at
domestic and international courts. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International
Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1 (2014). This Article makes an analogous comparison
between domestic and international systems but focuses on the investigations rather than the trials.
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This comparison depends on a way to measure and compare domestic
and international crimes. This Article uses the concept of gravity for that
purpose. At its simplest, gravity refers to the seriousness of the crime. 10 It
is not, however, an objective characteristic of crimes that can be easily or
directly measured.11 Moreover, there is no generally accepted definition of
gravity that already exists and can be applied to mass atrocity crimes.12
Thus, the first step in comparing the gravity of different crimes is finding a
way to measure gravity.
One of this Article’s most important contributions is its creation of an
empirical measure of crime gravity. This measure is based upon a
synthesis of the work of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the ICC, the
jurisprudence of the Court, the existing scholarship on the gravity of
international crimes, and domestic studies of crime severity. The result is a
measure comprised of both quantitative and qualitative factors that permits
the relative gravity of different crimes to be assessed. This allows the
crimes investigated by the ICC to be compared to crimes investigated in
domestic systems.
Once the crimes investigated at the ICC are compared to the most
serious mass atrocity crimes investigated in domestic systems, it becomes
clear that the crimes typically investigated by the ICC are of greater
gravity than the most serious mass atrocity crimes investigated by states.13
The crimes typically investigated by the ICC occur in more places and
over a longer period of time. They involve more victims of all kinds,
including more murder victims, and also regularly involve acts of
exceptional cruelty. They involve a number of types of victimization that
are not present in the domestic mass atrocity crimes, including rape,
torture, unlawful detention, and the forcible displacement of the civilian
population. In addition, they have a larger impact on the societies where
they occur. In short, they are more grave.
As a result of their greater gravity, one would expect that investigating
the crimes that come before the ICC would require greater resources than
investigating domestic mass atrocities. Yet, a comparison of the
investigative resources available to the ICC and the investigative resources
committed to domestic investigations show that national governments are
10. See infra text accompanying notes 23–26.
11. Cf. id. at 19 (noting the difference between subjective and objective characteristics).
12. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the
International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 269 (2012) (noting that “there is little
agreement” about how to define gravity).
13. See infra Part III.D.
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willing to devote vastly more resources to domestic mass atrocity
investigations.14 In fact, states faced with mass atrocity crimes have been
willing to devote dozens to hundreds of times more resources to those
investigations than the ICC is able to devote to its own investigations. This
disparity is startling and highlights how the ICC has tried to investigate
some of the most serious crimes imaginable with meager resources.
There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the
comparison of the investigative resources available in domestic and
international crimes. First, and most obviously, the ICC does not have
sufficient investigative resources. It has significantly fewer resources than
states think is appropriate when investigating similar atrocity crimes
committed on their own territory. Second, this lack of resources has
contributed to the ICC’s relative lack of success so far. The ICC’s
investigations have been too “thin” and several prosecutions have
15
collapsed or been compromised as a result. There are, of course, other
16
reasons for the difficulties the ICC has experienced. Nevertheless, the
ICC’s lack of resources is also to blame for its failure to live up to its
members’ expectations. Third, increasing the ICC’s investigative
resources would be an important step in improving the Court’s outcomes.
The comparison between domestic and international investigations
suggests that the ICC would be more successful if it had the resources to
conduct investigations more like those carried out in response to domestic
mass atrocity crimes. Given that most states agree that a successful ICC is
desirable,17 it follows that most states should support increasing the ICC’s
investigative resources because doing so would be in their own interest.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II explores the meaning of
crime gravity and its relationship to investigative difficulty. Part III
explores the gravity of the average ICC investigation and compares that to
a range of domestic mass atrocity investigations. Part IV describes the
investigative resources available during the average ICC investigation and
compares that to the resources available in domestic mass atrocity
investigations. Finally, Part V contains this Article’s conclusions.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 409–11.
16. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 412–23 (noting that lack of state cooperation and
some strategic mistakes have also hampered ICC investigations).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 431–35.
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II. THE GRAVITY OF CRIMES
The concept of gravity is central to this Article. Gravity serves as the
key to comparing the crimes investigated at the ICC to crimes investigated
in domestic systems. Without a measure of gravity how could one
meaningfully compare the shooting down of MH17 over Ukraine to the
bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie?18 Or, how could one
compare the London train bombings to the attack on the Oklahoma City
federal building?19 It would be even more difficult to compare these
domestic crimes to the crimes investigated by the ICC, like the postelection violence in Kenya or the attacks on civilian protesters in Libya.20
Certainly all of these crimes are very serious, but they are also different.
They are carried out in different ways, by different groups, for different
purposes, occur in different places, over different time periods, and result
in different numbers of victims of different types. They are all serious, but
21
which is more serious and why? Creating a measure of relative gravity
permits crimes committed in different jurisdictions to be compared to one
another meaningfully.
Gravity also serves a second purpose in this Article. In addition to
measuring the seriousness of crimes, it serves as a proxy for the difficulty
of the resulting criminal investigation. This is because the investigative
resources necessary to successfully investigate a crime increase as the
gravity of the crime being investigated increases.22 Thus, gravity can be
used to make inferences about the investigative resources that one would
need to successfully investigate different crimes. One would expect that
crimes of similar gravity would be assigned similar investigative
resources, while crimes of greater gravity would require greater
investigative resources. Less grave crimes, on the other hand, would
usually require fewer investigative resources. This relationship between
gravity and investigative resources makes it possible to evaluate the level
of investigative resources available to the ICC by comparing the ICC’s
resources to the resources available in domestic investigations of
comparable gravity. If the ICC consistently has fewer resources than
18. See discussion infra Parts III.C.7, III.C.1.
19. See discussion infra Parts III.C.5, III.C.3.
20. See discussion infra Parts III.A.6, II.A.4.
21. See deGuzman, supra note 12 (arguing that there is not widespread agreement about how to
identify the gravest crimes and that different people may reasonably use different criteria).
22. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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domestic investigations despite investigating similarly grave crimes, this
suggests that the ICC is under-resourced.
Without a way to measure gravity, this Article would not be possible.
Thus, the first step is to define gravity and find a way to measure it. The
second step is to explore the relationship between gravity and investigative
difficulty. Both of these issues are addressed below.
A. Defining Gravity
Generally, gravity refers to the importance or seriousness of a
23
24
phenomenon. Of course, it has other meanings, but in this Article it
refers to the importance or seriousness of a crime or group of related
crimes. The concept of crime gravity is roughly synonymous with both
crime severity and crime seriousness,25 but this Article will use the term
gravity over the alternatives because that is the term used in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.26
As a result of its inclusion in the Rome Statute, gravity is an important
concept at the ICC.27 The gravity of the crimes is a factor the Prosecutor
28
must consider before initiating investigations. In addition, the Court is
required to consider whether the cases advanced by the Prosecutor are of
sufficient gravity before it can hear them,29 and gravity plays a role at
sentencing.30 In fact, the term is used nine times in the Rome Statute.31 In

23. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (Angus Stevenson & Christine Lindberg eds., 3d
ed. 2010) (defining gravity as “extreme or alarming importance; seriousness”).
24. See, e.g., id. (“the force that attracts a body toward the center of the earth”).
25. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court,
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1400 (2009) (noting that gravity and seriousness are synonymous).
26. The terms severity or seriousness will sometimes be used as alternatives to gravity for
stylistic purposes, but they should be viewed as simply another way of saying gravity, unless the text
explicitly indicates otherwise.
27. See generally deGuzman, supra note 25.
28. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 53(1)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. See also deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1412–15 (describing the
Prosecutor’s obligation to consider gravity before initiating an investigation).
29. See Rome Statute art. 17(1)(d) (noting that the court is required to conclude that a case is of
sufficient gravity before that case is admissible before the court).
30. Id. art. 78(1) (noting that the court “shall” consider the gravity of the crime when determining
the sentence).
31. Id. art. 7(1)(g) (referring to the gravity of crimes of sexual violence); art. 17(1)(d) (referring
to the gravity of individual cases); art 53(1)(c) (referring to the gravity of the crimes being
investigated); art. 53(2)(c) (referring to the gravity of the crimes being investigated); art. 59(3)
(referring to the gravity of the crimes being charged); art. 77(1)(b) (referring to the gravity of the
crimes for which an individual has been found guilty); art. 78(1) (referring to the gravity of the crimes
for which an individual has been found guilty); art. 84(1)(c) (referring to the gravity of official
misconduct); art. 90(7)(b) (referring to the gravity of the charged conduct).
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all but one of those instances, it refers to the seriousness of criminal
conduct.32
Despite requiring various organs within the ICC to make
determinations about the gravity of crimes, the Rome Statute does not
33
define the term. Nevertheless, the OTP must have a way to evaluate the
gravity of crimes because the OTP cannot open an investigation unless the
crimes being investigated are of sufficient gravity,34 and it cannot send a
case to trial unless the charges are sufficiently grave.35 Thus, it makes
sense to begin searching for a measure of gravity by looking at the
definition that has been adopted by the OTP.
1. The OTP’s Definition
The OTP must have a way to assess the gravity of crimes so that it can
36
comply with the requirements of the Rome Statute. And indeed, the OTP
has developed a definition that it uses to evaluate the relative gravity of the
crimes it investigates and prosecutes.37 This definition is set out in the
OTP’s internal regulations, which state that the gravity of crimes should
be measured based on: (1) their scale; (2) their nature; (3) the manner of
38
their commission; and (4) their impact. These four factors are vague and
open-ended, and there have been calls for the OTP to explain in more
detail what they mean.39 Perhaps in response to those criticisms, the OTP

32. See supra note 31. The only time that the term gravity is used in the Rome Statute to refer to
something other than the seriousness of criminal conduct is when it is used to refer to judicial
misconduct that might serve as the basis for a revision of the conviction or sentence. See Rome Statute
art. 84(1)(c).
33. See Susana SáCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International
Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 817 (2008) (noting that “because the term ‘gravity’ is
not defined in the Rome Statute or any of the other governing documents of the ICC, the appropriate
role of ‘gravity’ in the ICC remains a matter of debate”). But see deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1406–
08 (arguing that some hints about the meaning of gravity can be deduced from the elements of the
crimes that are within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction).
34. See Rome Statute art. 53(a)(1)(c).
35. See Rome Statute art. 17(1)(d).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35.
37. This definition evolved over time, and it took several years before it reached its current form.
See SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 824–26 (2008) (noting that the OTP’s definition of gravity
developed over time).
38. See Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Doc. No.
ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009), at Reg. 29(2). See also Office of the Prosecutor, Report on
Preliminary Examination Activities (2015) ¶ 7 (Nov. 12, 2015) (noting that gravity includes an
assessment of the “scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, and their impact”); Office of the
Prosecutor [OTP], Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations ¶ 9 (Nov. 2013) (same).
39. See Ignaz Stegmiller, The Gravity Threshold under the ICC Statute: Gravity Bach and Forth
in Lubanga and Ntaganda, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 547, 564 (2009) (noting that the four factors laid out
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explained how it would evaluate each of the factors in its 2013 Policy
Paper on Preliminary Examinations.
According to the OTP, the scale of the crimes can be assessed by
looking at “the number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the
damage caused by the crimes, . . . [and] their geographical or temporal
40
spread . . . .” This factor focuses on the number of victims and the scope
of the crimes. It acknowledges that crimes become more grave as the
number of victims increases and as their geographic and temporal scope
increases.
The nature of the crimes “refers to the specific elements of each
41
offense such as the killings, rapes, and other crimes . . . .” In effect, the
nature of the crimes refers to the specific kinds of wrongful acts that have
been committed like murder, rape, or torture. It also implicitly recognizes
that there is a hierarchy among crimes and that some kinds of crimes are
graver than others. For example, as noted below, killings are generally
viewed as more grave than rapes, which are in turn viewed as more grave
42
than assaults.
The manner of the commission of the crimes focuses on how the
crimes were carried out, in particular “the extent to which the crimes were
systematic or result from a plan or organized policy . . ., [any] elements of
particular cruelty, including the vulnerability of the victims, [and] any
43
motives involving discrimination.” This factor recognizes that even
though two crimes may be legally equivalent (e.g., two murders), the way
in which those crimes are carried out can affect their gravity. 44 Thus,
crimes that are organized or systematic are more grave than crimes that
lack this feature. Crimes that target vulnerable groups, like women,
children or the elderly, are more grave than crimes that do not. Crimes of
exceptional cruelty are more grave than the same crime carried out without
exceptional cruelty.
Finally, the impact of the crimes is assessed by the “suffering[] endured
by the victims . . . , or the social, economic and environmental damage
45
inflicted on the affected communities. It thus focuses on the effect of the

in Internal Regulation 29(2) require further “definition” and proposing that the OTP enlarge upon their
meaning in “another policy paper”).
40. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 62.
41. Id. ¶ 63.
42. See infra text accompanying note 110.
43. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 64.
44. See infra text accompanying note 112.
45. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 65.
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crimes on the victims and their communities. It acknowledges that the
consequences of the crimes for the victims also affect their gravity. Taken
together, these four factors are used by the OTP to assess the potential
46
gravity of crimes when considering whether to open an investigation.
The gravity evaluation is not a purely mathematical process and the
OTP has acknowledged that it includes both “quantitative and qualitative
47
considerations.” Some factors, like the number of victims of various
crimes, lend themselves to a quantitative approach. Other factors, like
whether the crimes were carried out in an exceptionally cruel manner, are
qualitative. These quantitative and qualitative factors are combined to
assess the overall gravity of the crimes under consideration.
These factors could be used to create a measure of crime gravity, but is
the OTP’s definition of gravity a good one? Is it the best one? The OTP
has developed the most comprehensive definition of gravity of any of the
organs at the ICC, but perhaps there are alternative definitions that are
better? Thus, this Article will consider several alternative sources of a
gravity definition. First, it will look at the drafting history of the Rome
Statute to determine whether the creators of the ICC had a particular
definition in mind. Next, it will look at the Court’s decisions on gravity.
Third, it will consider the work of international criminal law scholars who
have written about the gravity requirement in the Rome Statute. Finally, it
will look beyond the ICC at the literature on domestic crime severity.
Taken together, these should point the way to a definition that can be used
as a basis for an empirical measure of crime gravity.
2. The Drafting History of the Rome Statute
While gravity is not defined in the Rome Statute,48 one place to look
for a definition is its drafting history.49 The concept of gravity in
international criminal law predates the Rome Statute by several decades.50
The International Law Commission (ILC) began to focus on gravity in the
1980s as part of its work on a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
46. Id. ¶ 66.
47. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 61 (noting that the ICC has
taken the position that gravity “includes both quantitative and qualitative considerations”).
48. See supra text accompanying note 33.
49. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(indicating that the “preparatory work of a treaty” may be used as a supplementary means of
interpreting the treaty).
50. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1416–21.
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Security of Mankind.51 Some members of the ILC suggested using gravity
to determine which international crimes should be included in the Draft
Code.52 The ILC did eventually decide to focus on the gravest crimes for
inclusion in the Draft Code, but it was never able to agree on a formal
definition of gravity.53
In the 1990s, the ILC began work on what would later become the
54
Rome Statute. One of the initial questions the ILC faced was which
crimes to include within the jurisdiction of the Court. Some participants
felt that all international crimes should be within the jurisdiction of the
55
court, while others felt that only the gravest crimes should be included.
After much debate, the drafters of the Rome Statute eventually agreed that
the ICC should focus on the gravest crimes, but they were again unable to
agree on a formal definition of gravity.56 As a result, the term ended up
being used extensively in the Rome Statute but it is never defined.57
This history demonstrates that at the time the Rome Statute was drafted
everyone involved knew that gravity would play an important role at the
ICC. The drafters were also aware of the lack of a definition, but were not
58
able to supply the Court with an explicit definition. In short, there was
no agreement on a definition of gravity prior to the entry into force of the
Rome Statute. Ultimately, the drafting history does not provide much
insight into the meaning of gravity.59
51. Id. at 1417. The Draft Code was an attempt to identify and codify the elements of
international criminal law. See Stuart Ford, Crimes Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia: Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 125, 153 (2007).
52. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1418.
53. Id. at 1418.
54. Id. at n.80.
55. Id. at 1419–20.
56. Id. at 1419–21, 1424. See also SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 820–23 (noting that the
drafters of the Rome Statute consciously chose to retain gravity as a requirement but that no explicit
definition of gravity was provided).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 27–33.
58. See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1424 (noting that the Chilean delegation at the Rome
Conference specifically requested that gravity be defined but that there was insufficient support for the
proposal).
59. The drafting history does indicate that all of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC
were considered by the drafters to be grave crimes. See supra text accompanying note 56.
Unfortunately, this insight is not very useful in deriving an empirical measure of gravity.
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3. The Decisions
The next logical place to look for guidance is in the Court’s decisions.
Since the Court is required to consider whether the cases that come before
it are of sufficient gravity to be admissible,60 gravity has been discussed in
a number of cases. The first time it came up was in the Lubanga case.
However, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on gravity in that case was
61
harshly criticized by scholars and overruled by the Appeals Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber did not, however, offer its own definition.62 This
forced the Pre-Trial Chamber to essentially start over from scratch. This
Article will focus on the court’s subsequent attempts to define gravity.
In February 2010 in the Abu Garda case, Pre-Trial Chamber I proposed
a new definition of gravity that focused on the “nature, manner and
impact” of the alleged crimes.63 Later decisions referenced the Abu Garda
decision but reframed the definition of gravity into the four factors that the
OTP is currently using: scale, nature, manner of commission, and
impact.64 While the latest decision contains an interesting disagreement
between the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I about how to apply those
factors in the specific situation under consideration,65 the Pre-Trial
Chambers have consistently used the OTP’s definition since 2010.
It is noticeable, however, that the Pre-Trial Chamber decisions are
largely devoid of reasoning. To begin with, the Abu Garda decision’s
definition of gravity was proposed by the OTP.66 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s

60. See supra text accompanying note 29.
61. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1425–28 (noting that the first Pre-Trial Chamber decision
that offered a definition of gravity was overturned by the Appeals Chamber); Stephen Eliot Smith,
Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC’s Initial Lubanga Decision and its Regressive Consequences,
8 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 331 (2008) (arguing that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s first decision on the meaning
of gravity was misguided); SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33 (same).
62. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1425–28.
63. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 31 (Feb. 8, 2010).
64. See Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Article 15
of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
¶ 188 (Mar. 31, 2010); Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, Corrigendum to
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ¶ 204 (Nov. 15, 2011); Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of
the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, Decision on the
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an
investigation, ¶ 21 (July 16, 2015).
65. See Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic
and the Kingdom of Cambodia, supra note 64. Judge Peter Kovacs, in dissent, criticizes the way in
which the majority applied the gravity factors. Id. at Annex.
66. See Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, supra note 63, ¶ 31 n.57.
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reasoning boils down to “agree[ing] with the Prosecution” that “several
factors may be taken into account in the assessment of the gravity of a
67
68
case.” It then adopted the Prosecution’s proposed definition. There is
no discussion of why these are the appropriate factors or whether the
Chamber considered other definitions before adopting the Prosecution’s
definition. The later decisions simply restate the four factor test without
debate. The only authority they offer for this definition is a citation to the
Pre-Trial Chamber decision in Abu Garda.69 There is little evidence that
the Pre-Trial Chambers have given much thought to how to define gravity
or whether the Prosecution’s preferred definition is the best one available.
Ultimately, the court’s decisions on gravity support the OTP’s definition,
but the lack of reasoning means they provide only weak support.
4. Scholarship on Gravity
Turning now to the scholarship, a number of international criminal law
scholars have analyzed the gravity requirement in the Rome Statute.70 The
most thorough of these articles is written by Professor deGuzman. She
proposes that gravity be measured by six factors, four of which are the
71
same factors that the OTP and the Pre-Trial Chambers have adopted. Her
two additional factors relate to the role and intent of the perpetrator.72
While Professor deGuzman is correct that a focus on the role and intent of
the perpetrator is necessary to assess the gravity of a particular case
brought to trial at the ICC, these factors are less relevant to determining
73
the overall gravity of a situation that the ICC is investigating. Since this
Article is concerned with assessing the gravity of situations rather than
assessing the charges against particular accused persons, factors related to
67. Id. ¶ 31.
68. Id.
69. See Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, supra note 64, ¶ 204; Situation on the
Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, The Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of
Cambodia, supra note 64, ¶ 21.
70. See deGuzman, supra note 25; SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33; Smith, supra note 61;
Stegmiller, supra note 39.
71. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1449–56.
72. Id. at 1454–56.
73. Id. at 1451 (arguing that factors relevant to the perpetrators must be considered when the
gravity of particular charged crimes are determined under Article 17 of the Rome Statute, but
acknowledging that “when such determinations relate to situations, the perpetrator-related factors will
often be irrelevant since the likely perpetrators may not yet be known”). See also Stegmiller, supra
note 39, at 563 (distinguishing between the concept of “gravity of the crime” which refers to the
severity of the offence and “gravity of the case” which refers to the specifics of particular charges
against an individual and “might be broader, including the circumstances of the individual”).
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particular perpetrators will not be used to assess gravity in this Article.
Ultimately, Professor deGuzman essentially agrees with the OTP that
gravity of situations should be measured by the scale, nature, manner of
74
commission, and impact of the crimes.
Professor deGuzman also offers some proposals about how to assess
these four factors. She suggests that the scale of the crimes should focus
on the number of victims as well as the geographic and temporal scope of
the violence.75 The nature of the harm should focus on the relative
seriousness of different acts. In this regard, she argues that there is a
hierarchy of criminal acts, with murder being the most serious, crimes of
sexual violence being almost as serious as murder, and crimes that involve
serious physical or psychological suffering—like torture—being lower on
76
the scale. Property crimes will generally rank as the least serious form of
criminality.77
According to Professor deGuzman, the manner of commission factor
should focus on factors such as the systematic nature of the crimes,
whether they are the result of a plan or policy, whether they involve
78
particular cruelty, and whether the victims are members of vulnerable
79
groups like women, children or the elderly. Finally, she argues that the
“impact of the crimes” factor should focus on whether the crimes have an
80
effect on society beyond the effect on immediate victims. For example,
she notes that attacks on humanitarian workers could have an impact on
many people beyond the workers themselves because of the possibility
that the attacks will disrupt the delivery of crucial aid.81 It is striking how
similar this analysis is to the OTP’s explanation of the gravity factors in its
2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.82 Indeed, it seems
possible that the OTP’s definition of gravity was influenced by Professor
deGuzman’s article, although her article is not cited in the Policy Paper on
Preliminary Examinations.
74. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1451–54.
75. Id. at 1451–52.
76. Id. at 1452.
77. Id.
78. As an example of particular cruelty, Professor deGuzman suggests that “deliberately slow
killing” would qualify as a “particularly heinous way” to commit murder. Id. at 1453.
79. Id. at 1453.
80. Id. at 1453–54.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.
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Dr. Stegmiller also broadly agrees with the OTP’s four factor approach
to gravity.83 He does question whether the fourth factor (impact) is an
appropriate consideration,84 but he is willing to accept impact as a gravity
factor if it relates to the impact on the victims rather than the impact on
non-victims.85 In this regard, he disagrees with Professor deGuzman, who
86
would consider the impact on non-victims as a component of gravity. Dr.
Stegmiller also recommended that the OTP flesh out what it meant by
87
scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact, which it subsequently
88
did.
Professors SáCouto and Cleary have also weighed in on the meaning of
gravity. In their article, they argue that the OTP should be flexible in
89
determining which factors to consider in particular situations. But they
also recommend that the OTP consider factors like the scale and
“systematicity” of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victims, the
manner in which the crimes were carried out, and the vulnerability of the
90
victims. They base these recommendations, in part, on the factors that
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) used in assessing
91
the gravity of the accused’s crimes at sentencing. While Professors
SáCouto and Cleary do not use exactly the same terminology as the OTP,
there is substantial overlap between their recommendations and the
definition the OTP ultimately adopted.92
Ultimately, the scholars who have considered how the OTP should
define gravity have made recommendations that are largely consistent with
93
the definition the OTP adopted. Of course, there is some disagreement
94
among the academics, but there is also a high level of agreement. Thus,
the international criminal law scholarship supports the OTP’s definition.
83. See Stegmiller, supra note 39, at 560–61.
84. Id. at 560 (“In my view, broader impact clearly belongs to other potential considerations
under the ‘interests of justice’ clause.”).
85. Id. at 561 (“If the Prosecutor thereby refers to the narrower impact on victims, an inclusion
into the gravity criterion could be approved.”).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81.
87. See Stegmiller, supra note 83, at 564.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 40–47.
89. SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 843.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 840–42.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 38–47.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 70–92.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
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5. Crime Severity Studies
A final way to evaluate the OTP’s definition is to look at gravity
definitions that are unrelated to the ICC. One body of work that addresses
the seriousness of crimes in a completely different context is the field of
crime severity studies. This is a growing body of literature that studies
how people perceive the severity of different crimes, although it has
focused exclusively on domestic crimes so far. This section will use the
results of empirical studies of crime severity to assess the OTP’s
definition.
An important question in the field has been whether crime severity can
or should be studied empirically.95 Some authors have argued that
evaluating crime gravity should not be an objective process.96 On the other
hand, other writers have argued that crime gravity can and should be
evaluated empirically.97 The empirical approach to crime severity is
founded on the premise that if there is some basic agreement about the
relative gravity of different crimes that most people share, then it should
be possible to create a gravity measure that would be widely accepted as
accurate.98 And indeed, there is “wide general agreement and stability
across different social sectors and populations groups with regard to the
relative seriousness of behaviors considered to be criminal.”99 This

95. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1830–31 (2007) (noting that while discussions of crime seriousness have
historically been based on “a philosophical concept of justice, drawn from the reasoned analysis of
moral philosophers” there has been recent interest in an “empirical conception” which could be
“subject to empirical testing”).
96. See deGuzman, supra note 25, at 1401–02 (noting the difficulty of ranking or quantifying
human suffering). Cf. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 76 (1985) (“Rating crimes is ultimately a matter
of making value judgments, on which persons reasonably may differ.”); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence
and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1263–64 (2005) (arguing that
it is not desirable to create an empirical measure of crime gravity).
97. See generally Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95. See also Jeffrey Bellin, Crime Severity
Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 26 (2011) (arguing that courts should not be permitted to define crime severity entirely
subjectively).
98. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV.
1633, 1635–36 (2007) (noting that creating a ranking of crime gravity that will be broadly accepted
depends on there being general agreement about what makes one crime more serious than another).
See also Bellin, supra note 97, at 26–29 (arguing that “[g]uideposts must be erected to ensure
predictability . . . [and] create consistency . . . .”).
99. See Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of Crime Seriousness and
Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 103, 107 (2003). See also Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1854–55 (2007)
(noting that there is “broad consensus regarding the relative seriousness of different wrongdoings” and
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agreement holds true not just within countries but also across different
countries.100 Thus, it should be possible to create a measure of gravity that
incorporates criteria that are generally understood to be associated with
crime severity and which produces an assessment of relative gravity that
101
most people would agree with.
Unfortunately, the existing studies of crime gravity focus on the kinds
of crimes that occur most frequently in domestic settings.102 For example,
in one such study by Professors Robinson and Kurzban, the study
103
The
participants were asked to rank twenty-four potential crimes.
crimes ranged in seriousness and included such things as “theft by taking,
theft by fraud, property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping,
rape, negligent homicide, manslaughter, murder and torture . . . .” 104 The
crime that was consistently ranked as the most grave included the rape,
torture, and subsequent murder of a child.105 This is consistent with most
surveys of crime severity, which find that violent crimes, particularly
those that lead to death or serious injury, are consistently viewed as the
106
most serious. But as awful as this crime is, it pales in comparison to the
107
Thus, the existing
crimes that are typically investigated by the ICC.
crime severity literature sheds little light on which of the following crimes
that this consensus exists across “a variety of issues and demographics”); Id. at 1855–59 (summarizing
the results of numerous studies that have shown broad agreement about the relative gravity of different
crimes).
100. See Robinson et al., supra note 98, at 1637 (noting that there is widespread agreement about
how to rank the seriousness of crimes both across different demographic groups within countries and
between individuals from different countries); Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1862–65 (2007)
(describing how the results on crime severity first obtained in the United States have been replicated
by studies in many other countries).
101. Cf. Bellin, supra note 97, at 25–31 (arguing that it is possible to create a framework for
understanding the gravity of crimes that is basically objective in nature).
102. See, e.g., Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1867 n.172 (noting that the authors chose
their scenarios because they covered the sorts of crimes most often committed in the United States).
103. Id. at 1867.
104. Id. The complete text of the crimes is included in Robinson and Kurzban’s article at
Appendix A.
105. Scenario 24 was the one that almost everybody in their study ranked as the most serious. Id.
at 1869. The complete text of Scenario 24 was: “John kidnaps an 8 year-old girl for ransom, rapes her,
then records the child’s screams as he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her
parents to induce them to pay his ransom demand. Even though they pay as directed, John strangles the
child to death to avoid leaving a witness.” Id. at 1898.
106. See Herzog, supra note 99, at 107. See also Stuart P. Green, Why It’s A Crime to Tear the
Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1533, 1564–65 (1997) (noting that in many surveys of crime severity, the most serious crimes
included things like planting a bomb in a public building that explodes killing twenty people, beating a
young child to death, the deliberate killing of a person for a fee, and the forcible rape of a neighbor).
107. See infra Part III.B (describing the average ICC investigation).
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people would view as more grave: 500 murders; 1,000 rapes; or forcing
100,000 people to flee their homes. As a result, that literature cannot easily
be used to create a gravity measure that would apply directly to the crimes
typically investigated by the ICC.
Nevertheless, the OTP’s approach is consistent with the existing
literature on crime severity because it focuses on factors like the number
of victims, the specific harm the victims suffered, the type of victim, and
108
the manner in which the crimes were carried out. These are all factors
that have been found to be important to individuals’ assessment of crime
gravity. For example, in The National Survey of Crime Severity,
participants rated a number of different variations on a person planting a
bomb in a public building. The severity of the crime increased as the
109
The National Survey of Crime Severity
number of victims increased.
also found that killings were generally more serious than rapes, which
were more serious than the infliction of physical injury, which was itself
110
The identity of the victim also
more serious than property crimes.
matters, with crimes against children generally being viewed as more
serious than the same crime against an adult.111 Finally, the manner in
which the crime was carried out mattered, even when the harm was held
112
constant. Taken together, these findings suggest that the OTP’s gravity
definition is appropriate because it focuses on many of the same factors
that empirical studies of crime severity have found to be indicators of
gravity.
There is definitely room, however, for empirical studies of crime
severity that focus on the kinds of crimes (and the kinds of crime
participation) that occur most frequently in serious violations of
113
international criminal law. Such a study might indicate a better way to

108. See supra text accompanying notes 38–45.
109. See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY (June 1985)
at vi (“[The] consequences strongly affect the ratings, a fact that is repeatedly apparent when similar
crimes with different outcomes are examined. For example, the items scored 72.1, 43.9, 33.0, and 24.5
are all the same, planting a bomb that goes off in a public building. The outcomes range from 20
people killed to no one injured, and the scores descend in seriousness reflecting the differing
outcomes.”).
110. This can be seen quite clearly from the rank ordering of the crimes. Id. at vi–x. The crimes
that were ranked as most serious involved the death of a victim. Rape appears on the list after the
crimes involving the death of the victim and before the crimes that involved physical injury to the
victim. The crimes that were ranked as least serious involved damage to or theft of property. Id.
111. Id. at vi. See also id. at 47.
112. See id. at 28, tbl.18 (noting that a crime carried out with a gun was ranked as more severe
than the same crime carried out with a lead pipe, which was itself ranked as more severe than the same
crime carried out without any weapon).
113. For example, Professor deGuzman suggests that there is no easy way to measure the gravity
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create a measure of gravity that would be tailored to the kinds of crimes
that are usually investigated and prosecuted at the ICC. But in the
meantime, the OTP’s gravity definition is consistent with the results of
empirical crime severity studies.
B. Measuring the Gravity of Mass Atrocities
The OTP’s definition of gravity is a reasonable basis for a gravity
measure. First, the Rome Statute does not contain a definition of gravity
114
and the drafting history does not suggest one either. Second, the OTP’s
definition is consistent with the definition that has been adopted by the
Pre-Trial Chambers, although it is not clear how much effort the Pre-Trial
Chamber has put into defining gravity.115 Third, the scholars who have
considered how the OTP should define gravity have made
recommendations that are consistent with the definition the OTP
ultimately adopted.116 Of course, there is some disagreement among the
academics, but there is more agreement than disagreement.117 The OTP’s
approach also appears to be generally consistent with how other
international criminal courts have defined gravity, albeit in the somewhat
118
different context of sentencing decisions. Finally, the OTP’s definition
is consistent with empirical studies of crime severity. Taken together, this
suggests that the OTP’s gravity definition is an appropriate one. Thus, this
Article’s gravity measure is based on the OTP’s explanation of gravity in
119
its 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.
The next problem becomes how to convert the OTP’s definition into a
measure that can be used to compare the gravity of crimes committed in
different settings. As the OTP has noted, some of the factors it considers
can be reduced to quantitative measures, most notably the number of
victims. But gravity is not solely a function of these quantitative
components and also is comprised of some qualitative components. The
of international crimes and that reasonable people can differ in their gravity determinations. She seems
to suggest that there is no way to create a broadly-accepted measure of gravity. See deGuzman, supra
note 12, at 288 (arguing that determinations of “[s]eriousness of harm” are individualized and
“incommensurable”). Given the findings of domestic crime severity surveys, it seems likely that
Professor deGuzman is wrong and that there is some agreement about how to rank the most serious
crimes, but we will not know where the areas of agreement are until the issue is studied empirically.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 50–58.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 61–69.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 70–92.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
118. SáCouto & Cleary, supra note 33, at 840–42 (2007).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.
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factors that make up this Article’s gravity measure were chosen so that
they would capture as much of the OTP’s definition as possible, both the
quantitative and qualitative components.
The gravity measure used in this Article is comprised of eight factors:
120
(1) the number of crime sites
included in the investigation; (2) the
amount of time over which the crimes occurred; (3) the structure and
organization of the alleged perpetrator groups; (4) the identity of the
victims, particularly whether the victims were civilians and whether
women or children were targeted; (5) the number of the victims, including
the particular number of victims who were killed, raped, wounded, or
displaced; (6) the use of exceptionally cruel or brutal means of conducting
the crimes; (7) whether the crimes were carried out with a discriminatory
motive; and (8) the legal qualification of the crimes (i.e., whether the ICC
is treating the crimes as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
genocide). Taken together, these eight factors permit the seriousness of
different mass atrocity crimes to be meaningfully compared to one
121
another.
These factors were chosen because they shed light on the scale, nature,
manner of commission and impact of the crimes. The first factor, the
number of crime sites, indicates the number of places at which crimes
have occurred. It thus measures the geographic scope of the crimes, a
122
component of the scale of the crimes. The second factor, the amount of
time over which the crimes occurred, relates to the temporal scope of the
crimes and is also a component of the scale of the crimes.123 As the
geographic and temporal scope of the crime increases, its gravity
increases.
The third factor, the structure and organization of the perpetrator
groups, is related to the manner in which the crimes are committed.124
Systematic crimes are more likely to be committed by hierarchicallyorganized groups because the hierarchical nature of such organizations
120. A crime site is a location where the prosecution believes a crime (or part of a crime) within
the jurisdiction of the court may have occurred. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International
Criminal Trials Is Necessary, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 161 (2015).
121. Cf. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 95, at 1854–55 (noting that while people do not always
agree on the absolute seriousness of different crimes, there is much more agreement on the relative
seriousness of different crimes). This means that, while it may not be possible to make an absolute
determination of the seriousness of different mass atrocity crimes, it ought to be possible to make
relative determinations of the seriousness of these crimes such that they can be compared to one
another. Id. at n.114.
122. See supra text accompanying note 40.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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makes it much easier to implement them. And indeed, the majority of
serious international crimes are carried out by hierarchically-organized
groups.125 Thus, the structure and organization of the perpetrator groups
can act as a proxy for the systematic nature of the crimes, and crimes that
are committed systematically or pursuant to an organized policy are more
126
grave.
The fourth factor focuses on the identity of the victims, particularly
whether the victims are civilian and whether they are women or children.
This factor goes to the manner of the commission of the crimes, including
whether they were directed at vulnerable victims.127 Civilians, particularly
women and children, are vulnerable victims and targeting them increases
the gravity of the crime.
The fifth factor focuses on the number of victims who suffered
particular harms, including death, rape, serious injury, and displacement.
This factor contributes to the scale of the crimes128 and their nature.129 It
can also serve as a measure of the impact of the crimes because it indicates
both the magnitude of the suffering of the victims and the likely impact of
the crimes on the victims’ communities.130 As the number of victims
increases the gravity of the crime increases too. Similarly, as the particular
harms become more serious, the gravity of the overall crime increases.
The sixth factor, the use of cruel or brutal means of committing the
crimes, is relevant to the manner of the commission of the crimes.131
Crimes that exhibit particular cruelty or brutality are more grave.
Similarly, the seventh factor, the presence of a discriminatory motive, also
goes to the manner of commission.132 Crimes that are carried out with a
discriminatory motive are also more grave.
Finally, the eighth factor, the legal qualification of the crimes, can shed
light on the intent of the perpetrators, a factor in the assessment of the
133
manner in which the crimes were carried out. This is true because one

125. See infra text accompanying note 153.
126. Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, supra note 38, ¶ 64 (noting that crimes are more
grave if they are “systematic” or “result from a plan or organized policy”).
127. See supra text accompanying note 43.
128. Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 38, ¶ 62 (noting that the number of victims is a
component of the scale of the crimes).
129. Id. ¶ 63 (noting that the types of wrongful acts committed are a component of the nature of
the crimes).
130. Id. ¶ 65.
131. Id. ¶ 64.
132. Id.
133. Id. (noting that the manner of commission can be assessed by, among other things, the “intent
of the perpetrator” and “any motives involving discrimination”).

http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/5

2017] WHAT INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES DOES THE ICC NEED TO SUCCEED? 21

of the crimes—genocide—requires a discriminatory motive.134 It can also
shed light on the impact of the crimes because genocide requires that the
perpetrators intend to “destroy, in whole or in part,” a protected group.135
The requirement of an attempt to destroy a protected group implies a large
impact on the victim group. These eight factors serve as the basis for this
Article’s assessment of the relative gravity of both the crimes investigated
by the ICC and the most serious mass atrocity crimes investigated in
domestic systems.
C. Gravity and the Difficulty of Criminal Investigations
In addition to measuring the gravity of the crimes, these factors serve
another function in this Article. As shown below, the resources necessary
for a successful investigation generally increase as the gravity of the
136
Thus, the gravity factors both
crimes being investigated increases.
indicate the difficulty of investigating the alleged crimes and act as a
proxy for the investigative resources necessary to successfully complete an
investigation.137
The goal of every criminal investigation is to identify and collect
evidence sufficient to establish whether a crime has been committed and,
if so, identify who is legally responsible for that crime.138 No criminal trial

134. See Rome Statute, supra note 28, art. 6 (noting that the crime of genocide requires that the
physical elements be carried out with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group as such”).
135. Id.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 138–56. The following discussion on the factors affecting
the difficulty of international criminal investigations is rooted partly in literature, which is cited
throughout. However, it is also based on the Author’s personal experience. The Author was an
Assistant Prosecutor at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). One of his
primary duties was overseeing the preliminary investigations related to the “crime base.” He worked
with analysts and investigators to decide which crime sites to investigate, oversaw the work of
investigators carrying out the investigations, led a team of analysts who coded the results of the
investigations and entered that data into a database, provided legal advice on the sufficiency of the
collected information, and drafted the portions of the first Introductory Submission relating to the
crime base. His experience at the ECCC informs the discussion of the relationship between gravity and
investigative difficulty.
137. For purposes of this Article, an investigation is successful if all relevant leads are
investigated and all relevant information is collected. Success is not determined by whether the
investigation permits charges to be filed but rather by whether the investigation collects the
information necessary for the prosecutors to decide with confidence whether or not to bring charges.
See infra text accompanying notes 138–39.
138. See Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of
ICC Investigations, 3 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 3 (2014) (“Credible and reliable evidence is the
foundation of a criminal case; it underlies each and every aspect of the case that follows an arrest.
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can proceed without that evidence.139 If the purpose of the investigation is
to collect the evidence necessary to establish whether a particular crime
has occurred, it stands to reason that the larger the gravity of the suspected
crimes, the more resources will be necessary to conduct an investigation.
For example, evidence must be collected about each crime site that is
part of the investigation. The site must be identified, what occurred there
must be discovered and documented, and the connection between the
crime site and the rest of the investigation must be explored.140 In effect,
each crime site that is part of the investigation represents a commitment to
the expenditure of investigative resources. Therefore, the more crime sites
that are included in the investigation, the more resources will be needed to
conduct the investigation. Thus, the data on the number of crime sites
included in each of the ICC’s investigations acts as an indicator of the
resources necessary to carry out that investigation.
It also stands to reason that as the number of victims increases,
additional investigative resources will be needed. Of course, the needed
resources do not necessarily scale linearly with the number of victims.141
Nevertheless, it is probably true that the resources needed to investigate
mass atrocity crimes generally increase as the number of victims
increases.142 Thus, the number of victims of the crimes being investigated
can affect the necessary investigative resources.
The legal qualification of the crimes can also impact the required
investigative resources. The two most commonly investigated
international crimes—crimes against humanity and war crimes—have
143
jurisdictional requirements that must be proved. War crimes must take
144
place during an armed conflict.
Crimes against humanity must take
place as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian
Without it, there is no viable case. The goal of a criminal investigation is to identify and collect
evidence.”).
139. Id.; Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools:
Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 403, 403 (2004) (“No indictment can be issued, and no trial can take place, without
evidence.”).
140. See Ford, supra note 120, at 161.
141. A crime with 500 victims requires significantly more resources than a murder case with a
single victim, but it will probably not need 500 times as many resources. Similarly, a crime with 1,000
victims is not necessarily twice as difficult to investigate as a crime with 500 victims.
142. Cf. Ford, supra note 120, at 165.
143. See infra Table 1 (showing that crimes against humanity and war crimes are the two most
investigated crimes at the ICC).
144. See Rome Statute, supra note 28, art. 8.
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population.145 Proving these jurisdictional requirements takes investigative
resources. For example, establishing that an armed conflict existed
requires collecting evidence about the length and intensity of the fighting
as well as evidence about the structure and organization of the groups
146
participating in the violence. Proving that a murder constitutes a crime
against humanity requires proving that it “was committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”147
Therefore, the investigators must conduct additional investigative work to
establish that a widespread or systematic attack was occurring at the time
and that the particular crime being investigated was committed as part of
that attack. Thus, collecting data on the legal qualification of the crimes
under investigation can shed light on the investigative resources that must
be devoted to establishing the jurisdictional requirements of the various
crimes.
Significant resources must also be devoted to identifying who is legally
responsible for the crimes that are uncovered.148 A distinction is often
made in international criminal investigations between the “crime base”
evidence and the “linking” or “linkage” evidence.149 The crime base
evidence demonstrates that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have
been committed.150 This evidence arises largely from the investigation of
the individual crime sites.151 While the investigation of the crime base may
identify some low-level direct perpetrators, further investigation is almost
always required.152 Most international crimes are committed by

145. Id. art. 7(1).
146. See infra notes 185, 186 (discussing the legal elements of proving the existence of an armed
conflict).
147. Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(a), ICC Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002).
148. While one of the key goals of a criminal trial is to establish that crimes have occurred, crimes
are committed by people. Another key purpose of a criminal trial is to establish which individuals bear
criminal responsibility for the crimes that have been committed. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note
28, art. 25(2) (“A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”).
149. See Ford, supra note 120, at 159 (describing linking evidence).
150. See Investigations, ICTY.ORG, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/
investigations (noting that the ICTY worked from the “bottom” upwards and began with the crime
base evidence which identified what crimes had occurred and the “lower-ranking persons who actually
committed” those crimes).
151. Id. (noting that investigators typically begin their investigation by interviewing witnesses,
then visit the crime site to corroborate the statements as well as photograph the site and collect
physical evidence).
152. See Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 427, 430
(2004) (noting that the initial investigations at the ICTY turned up “a great deal of information about
low and middle-level detention camp officials” but that it took considerable additional effort to obtain
the information necessary to begin indicting those higher up in the hierarchy, “[e]ven though there was
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hierarchically organized groups working together.153 Thus, the
investigators must also investigate whether any high-level indirect
perpetrators participated in the crimes.154 This aspect of the investigation
focuses on the “linking” evidence—i.e., the evidence that links the crime
base to higher-level perpetrators.155 Establishing that individuals who may
be geographically or organizationally removed from the crimes are legally
responsible for them is one of most difficult aspects of international
criminal prosecutions.156 Moreover, the larger and more complicated the
organizational structure of the perpetrator groups, the more difficult this
157
process becomes.
As a result, establishing individual criminal
responsibility for crimes committed by large hierarchically organized
groups is both very difficult to prove in court but also very difficult to
investigate. Thus, the data collected on the structure and organization of
the perpetrator groups can shed light on the resources necessary to
investigate them.
For these reasons, the factors used to assess the gravity of the alleged
crimes should act as a reasonable proxy for the difficulty of investigating
those crimes and the investigative resources necessary to successfully
complete such an investigation.
a general understanding among many of the OTP senior staff that the focus should be on the most
important perpetrators”). See also Investigations, ICTY.ORG, http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-ofthe-prosecutor/investigations (noting that the testimony of victims provided “invaluable crime base
evidence and links to the persons who had physically committed the crimes, such as soldiers, camp
guards and wardens” but that “the challenge was to link the crime base incidents with persons who did
not physically commit the crime but who may have ordered, planned, implemented or facilitated”
them).
153. See Stuart Ford, Fairness and Politics at the ICTY: Evidence from the Indictments, 39 N.
CAROLINA J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 45, 67–68 (2013).
154. See Groome, supra note 138, at 7 (“Often central to an international criminal investigation is
the question of whether senior officials participated in the crime.”).
155. Id. (noting that cases involving senior officials “require investigators to perform the
additional task of investigating and determining which officials within the chain of command structure
bear responsibility.”).
156. See Ford, supra note 120, § VII(A) (arguing that the difficulty of attributing responsibility for
crimes to high-level indirect perpetrators who are often geographically and organizationally distant
from the crimes is the principal cause of the complexity of international criminal trials). See also
Investigations, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about/office-of-the-prosecutor/investigations (noting that “legally linking the
persons higher up to the actual crimes committed is not easy and takes time” and that this process took
“took several years of work by many dedicated present and former members of the OTP”); Mirjan
Damaška, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 348 (2008)
(noting the difficulty of proving the criminal responsibility of “high-ranking officials who are remote
from the immediate perpetrators”).
157. See Ford, supra note 120, at 183.
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III. THE GRAVITY OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS
This part will assess the gravity of the ICC’s investigations and
compare them to the gravity of a selection of domestic mass atrocity
investigations.
A. The Gravity of the ICC’s Investigations
As of July 2015, the ICC had begun or completed investigations in nine
situations158: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Darfur, Côte
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Libya, Central African Republic (CAR) I, CAR
II,159 and Uganda.160 Each investigation will be summarized briefly
below. The summaries focus on the gravity factors listed above.161 They
are based on the publicly available information about the investigations. In
some cases, however, that information is incomplete.162
It is also important to note that the information collected below relates
to the scope of the OTP’s investigation, not the overall scale of the
atrocities committed. The OTP rarely, if ever, investigates every atrocity
committed in a particular conflict. For example, several hundred thousand
163
people have died in the conflict in Darfur in the years since it began, but

158. The term “situation” has a special meaning at the ICC. According to Article 13 of the Rome
Statute, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over “[a] situation in which one or more [of the crimes
described in Article 5 of the Statute] appears to have been committed.” See Rome Statute, supra note
28, art. 13. A situation is usually defined temporally and territorially. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 298–99 (Oxford
University Press 2010). Thus, a situation is a temporally and territorially defined space within which
one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the court may have been committed.
159. In 2014, the OTP opened a second investigation into crimes committed in the Central African
Republic, but this investigation (CAR II) covers crimes committed from 2012 onwards and is separate
from the investigation in CAR I, which covered crimes that took place in 2002 and 2003. See infra
Parts III.A.7 and III.A.8.
160. See Situations Under Investigation, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited
July 21, 2015). This list was accurate as of July 2015, when the data for this Article was collected.
There were, however, a number of preliminary examinations ongoing at that time and it is possible
(perhaps even likely) that additional investigations will have been initiated by the time this Article is
published.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
162. For example, the information on the situation in Uganda is incomplete because much of the
relevant information was filed under seal. See infra Part III.A.9.
163. See Darfur deaths ‘could be 300,000,’ BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2008, 9:38 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361979.stm (noting that while the government of Sudan estimated
that there had been 10,000 deaths, the World Health Organization had estimated that more than
200,000 people had died in Darfur).
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the OTP’s investigation focuses on only a subset of the deaths.164 The goal
of the OTP when deciding on the scope of the investigation is to select a
sample of incidents that are representative of the gravest acts and the main
165
types of victimization. This prioritization is necessitated by the Court’s
limited resources.166 As a result, the OTP’s investigations usually cover
just a small portion of the atrocities committed in any given situation.
1. The DRC167
The OTP’s investigation arising out of the situation in the DRC
covered two different armed conflicts that took place years apart.
Moreover, the investigation covered a period of slightly more than two
168
years and involved alleged crimes committed by four different armed
groups. Each of these armed groups was a sophisticated, hierarchically
organized group capable of sustaining significant military operations. The
arrest warrants show that the OTP investigated crimes committed at
twenty-four different locations.169 The victims of these attacks were
170
and the OTP alleges that at least 1,000 civilians were
civilians,

164. See infra Part III.B.2.
165. See Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, Request for authorization of an
investigation pursuant to article 15, ¶ 25 (June 23, 2011) (noting that the “incidents referred to in this
Application are not exhaustive” and that “[t]he Prosecution selected a limited number of incidents,
aiming to provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and the main types of
victimisation”). See also Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the Central African Republic II: Article
53(1) Report, ¶ 95 (Sept. 24, 2014) (noting that the OTP was focusing on the “most serious alleged
crimes” and that it had received information on more crimes than were described in its report).
166. See infra Part IV.A (describing the limited investigative resources available to the Court).
167. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section I of Stuart Ford, The Gravity of ICC Investigations Carried Out Between 2002 and 2015 (Feb.
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101764.
168. The investigation of the earlier conflict covered the period July 2002 to December 2003, a
period of eighteen months. See Ford, supra note 167, at 3. The investigation of the later conflict
covered the period January to September 2009, a period of nine months. Id. at 5. Combined, this
represents a period of twenty-seven months, or slightly more than two years.
169. This includes the six training camps described in the Dyilo arrest warrant, id. at 3, the six
villages described in the Ntaganda arrest warrant, id. at 4, the village disclosed in the Katanga arrest
warrant, id. at 4–5, and the eleven villages listed in the Mbarushimana arrest warrant, id. at 5.
170. A civilian is a person who is not a member of the armed forces. See JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
VOLUME 1: RULES 17 (2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf. This contrasts civilians with “combatants” who are those persons
who are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. Id. at 11. All persons who are part of
an organized armed force, group or unit which acts under the responsible command of a party to the
conflict are thus combatants. Id. at 14.
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murdered,171 thousands of civilians were injured, and at least 140,000
civilians were forcibly displaced. There were also a large but undisclosed
number of rapes and instances of sexual slavery, as well as wholesale
looting and destruction of property. In many cases, the attacks were
carried out by armed groups associated with one ethnic group against
members of other ethnic groups for the purpose of consolidating power
and territory. Finally, the conflicts in the DRC were marked by the
widespread use of child soldiers. These acts were charged as a variety of
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
2. Darfur172
The Darfur investigation involved alleged crimes occurring at more
than one hundred crime sites over a period of nearly five years. These
crimes took place during an armed conflict between the government of
Sudan and various rebel groups. The alleged perpetrators for the vast
majority of the crimes were armed forces associated with the government
of Sudan, but the OTP also investigated two rebel groups for their
173
All of the perpetrators
involvement in attacks on U.N. peacekeepers.
constituted hierarchically organized armed groups. The victims (with the
exception of the U.N. peacekeepers) were civilians who were chosen
largely because of their ethnicity. It appears that civilians were targeted
because the Sudanese government suspected their ethnic groups of
supporting the rebels. All told, thousands of civilians were killed,
thousands more were raped, and hundreds of thousands were displaced
from their homes. In addition, there was widespread torture, looting and
destruction of property. The OTP alleged that the Sudanese government’s
attacks took place with the intent of destroying certain ethnic groups. The
crimes were qualified as a variety of crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and genocide.
171. This includes the 800 deaths associated with the UPC/FPLC attacks. See Ford, supra note
167, at 4, and the 200 deaths associated with the FNI and FRPI attack on Bogoro village. Id. at 4–5.
This is obviously a minimum figure, as the OTP also alleged that the FLDR murdered civilians as part
of its attacks, but does not provide an estimate of the number killed. Id. at 5.
172. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section II of Ford, supra note 167.
173. Intentionally attacking UN peacekeepers is a violation of the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute
art. 8(2)(b)(iii).

Washington University Open Scholarship

28

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16:1

3. Côte D’Ivoire174
The OTP’s investigation in Côte d’Ivoire involved attacks by two
175
different sophisticated armed groups
that took place during an armed
conflict. These groups committed attacks at more than forty-five
176
throughout the country over a period of approximately five
locations
months. These attacks resulted in the deaths of more than a thousand
civilians, hundreds of rapes, and more than 500 unlawful and arbitrary
detentions. They were also accompanied by an unknown number of
instances of beatings, torture, inhumane treatment, and the destruction of
property. More than one million civilians were displaced by the violence.
The victims of these attacks were civilians and it appears both sides
targeted individuals because of their actual or perceived support for the
other side of the conflict. These acts were alleged to constitute a variety of
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
4. Kenya177
The Kenya investigation covered attacks by groups associated with two
rival political parties that took place in the aftermath of a disputed
election. Each group is alleged to have had sufficient organization to carry
out premeditated attacks involving large numbers of attackers at multiple
locations simultaneously, but they were not alleged to be “armed
178
groups.” These attacks took place all over the country over a period of
approximately two months, although the investigation apparently focused
on fifteen locations. More than 1,100 people were killed, at least 900 were
raped, more than 3,500 were seriously injured, and more than 350,000
were displaced from their homes. The victims were largely civilians who
were targeted because of their actual or perceived support for a rival
174. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section III of Ford, supra note 167.
175. The pro-Gbagbo forces included the country’s army, police and security services as well as
some armed militias. See Ford, supra note 167, at 7–8. The principal pro-Ouattara group, the Forces
Nouvelles, was organized like a conventional army. Id. at 9.
176. The ICC intended to investigate at least thirty crime sites associated with the pro-Gbagbo
forces and at least seventeen crime sites associated with the pro-Ouattara forces. Id. at 9–11.
177. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section IV of Ford, supra note 167.
178. The term “armed group” has a technical meaning in international criminal law and refers to
certain groups that participate in armed conflicts. To qualify as an armed group, a group must be
organized, operate under a responsible command, and have an internal disciplinary system that
enforces compliance with international humanitarian law. See infra note 187.
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group. The killings were often done in a particularly brutal fashion, with
victims being drowned, suffocated, stoned, and hung. Rapes and sexual
violence were also often extremely brutal and female victims sometimes
had their vaginas and labia cut with sharp objects, while male victims
sometimes had their penises amputated. These acts were alleged to
constitute a variety of crimes against humanity.
5. Mali179
The Mali investigation will examine attacks by five different groups,
including the Malian Armed Forces and four rebel groups, which took
place during an armed conflict. Each of these groups is hierarchically
organized, with two of them functioning as conventional armies and the
other three operating as smaller, but still organized, armed groups with
hierarchical command structures. The attacks under investigation took
place over a period of approximately five months and occurred at no less
than nine separate locations. The victims were either civilians or
180
The ICC indicated that the
combatants who were hors de combat.
violence resulted in between 100 and 200 killings, between 50 and l00
rapes, and the systematic destruction of property and religious buildings.
At least some of the killings were particularly cruel and involved
mutilating or disemboweling the victims. These acts were alleged to be a
variety of war crimes.
181

6. Libya

The OTP’s investigation of the situation in Libya focuses on attacks by
government forces on peaceful protesters. Over the course of
approximately two weeks, Libyan government forces attacked protesters at
twenty-six locations. These attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 750
179. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section V of Ford, supra note 167.
180. While it is generally lawful for combatants to attack and kill other active combatants during
an armed conflict, once combatants have been rendered “hors de combat” (which literally means
“outside the fight”) by injuries or capture, it is no longer lawful to attack or kill them. See, e.g., Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
(noting that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely” and that violence against them is
prohibited). See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 170, at 311.
181. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section VI of Ford, supra note 167.
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civilians, injuries to hundreds more, as well as the arrest, torture, and
unlawful imprisonment of hundreds. The victims were targeted because of
their participation in protests against the government. These attacks are
alleged to constitute a variety of crimes against humanity.
7. CAR I182
The OTP first investigated potential crimes in the Central African
Republic that were committed during an armed conflict that took place in
2002 and 2003. This investigation (called CAR I) covered crimes that
occurred over a period of approximately six months. The perpetrator is
alleged to be a sophisticated, hierarchically organized armed group. The
OTP intended to investigate violence that occurred at seven locations.
While there were a number of acts of murder and torture, the OTP
indicated that its investigation would focus largely on rape and sexual
violence, which it alleged to have been a central feature of the conflict.
The OTP indicated that there had been at least 600 reported rapes, but that
the actual number was probably far higher. The OTP alleged that rape was
used as a tool during the conflict, and that the perpetrator groups
committed their rapes in particularly brutal fashion, including through the
use of gang rapes, the public rape of victims, and by forcing relatives to
participate in rapes. The victims were civilians and these acts were alleged
to be a variety of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
8. CAR II183
In 2014, the OTP opened a second investigation (called CAR II) into
potential crimes committed in CAR, arising out of a separate armed
conflict that occurred during 2012 and 2013. The investigation will focus
on two perpetrator groups, both of which are hierarchically organized
armed groups. The OTP will investigate at least thirty-three attacks that
took place over a period of approximately two years. In the course of these
attacks, at least 2,600 civilians were killed, hundreds to thousands of
civilians were raped, thousands of homes were destroyed, and more than
one million civilians were displaced. The crimes were driven by
discriminatory motives and virtually the entire Muslim population of the
182. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section VII of Ford, supra note 167.
183. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section VIII of Ford, supra note 167.
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Central African Republic was forced to flee the country as a result of the
violence. These crimes were alleged to constitute a variety of crimes
against humanity and war crimes. In addition, the OTP indicated it would
investigate whether the deliberate targeting of Muslims by one of the
perpetrator groups was genocide.
9. Uganda184
Due to redactions in the public record, information about the OTP’s
investigation in Uganda is incomplete. The OTP investigated the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA), a hierarchically organized armed group that has
been carrying out an insurgency in Uganda since at least 1987. The OTP’s
investigation focused on a series of attacks on villages and internally
displaced persons’ camps that took place during 2003 and 2004, and were
part of the armed conflict between the LRA and the forces of the
government of Uganda. There were at least six such attacks that took place
over a period of several months to two years. These attacks resulted in the
deaths of a large but undisclosed number of civilians, as well as rapes,
inhumane acts, and enslavement. The victims were largely civilians,
including many women and children. Children, in particular, were
deliberately victimized during these attacks, with the LRA abducting large
numbers of children to be used as fighters, porters, and sex slaves. The
crimes were also committed in a particularly brutal fashion, and the OTP
alleges that many of the victims were hacked or bludgeoned to death.
These attacks were alleged to be a variety of war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
B. The Typical ICC Investigation
Many of the key facts related to the gravity of the ICC’s investigations
are summarized below in Table 1. All the information in this Part comes
from the data in Table 1 unless otherwise indicated. It is apparent from the
table that there are a number of similarities across the situations
investigated by the ICC. First, the alleged crimes in seven of the nine
situations took place during an armed conflict.185 The only two situations

184. The information in this part is a summary of the more detailed information presented in
Section IX of Ford, supra note 167.
185. Armed conflicts are either international or non-international in character. International armed
conflicts occur whenever there is any resort to military force between states. See ROBERT CRYER ET
AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 279 (2010). Noninternational armed conflicts require “sustained and concerted military operations” between states and
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the ICC has investigated so far that did not involve an armed conflict were
in Kenya and Libya. In the latter two cases, there was extensive political
violence directed at civilian populations, but the OTP did not allege that
186
the violence rose to the level of an armed conflict.
Nevertheless,
widespread organized violence is a hallmark of the ICC’s investigations,
even when that violence is not categorized as an armed conflict.
Second, and related to the first point, the vast majority of the
perpetrators the ICC investigates are members of hierarchically organized
armed groups.187 In eight of the nine investigations, the perpetrators were
organized armed groups, including in one situation (Libya) that was not
classified as an armed conflict. Even though it was not an armed conflict,
the violence in Libya was allegedly perpetrated by the official armed
forces of the Libyan government.188 The only situation where the
perpetrators were not members of an organized armed group was Kenya.
Nevertheless, even in Kenya, the violence was perpetrated by groups that
had sufficient organization and capacity to plan and coordinate large-scale
attacks on civilians, even if they did not meet the definition of an armed
189
group under international law.
Another facet of the typical ICC investigation is that it involves
multiple perpetrator groups. Of the nine situations considered above, in six
of them the ICC was investigating more than one perpetrator group. In
many cases, this meant investigating alleged crimes committed by both
sides in an armed conflict.
“dissident armed forces or other organized groups” which operate under “responsible command.” See
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 art. 1(1). It is generally
accepted that this requires protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. See CRYER,
supra at 283.
186. Armed conflicts require protracted armed violence between organized armed groups. See
supra note 185. If the violence is not sufficiently intense or the groups are not organized enough, then
the violence will not be considered an armed conflict. See CRYER ET AL., supra note 185, at 283–84.
See also Protocol II, supra note 185, art. 1(2) (noting that “situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” are not
considered armed conflicts); Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(d) (same). See also infra note 187 (discussing the
organizational requirements necessary for an armed group).
187. To be considered an armed group or armed force under international law, a group must be
organized, operate under a responsible command, and have an internal disciplinary system that
enforces compliance with international humanitarian law. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 art. 43(1). See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note
170, at 15–16.
188. See supra Part III.A.6.
189. See supra Part III.A.4.
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The temporal scope of the alleged crimes shows a fair degree of
variation. In one situation, Libya, the crimes were all committed within a
two-week period. In a number of situations—like DRC, Darfur, and CAR
II—the crimes were committed over a period of years. Ultimately, Libya
appears to be an outlier, and the majority of ICC investigations cover a
period that ranges from six months to several years.
There is also considerable variation in the number of different crime
sites under investigation by the ICC in each situation. On the low end,
Uganda, Mali and CAR I, all had fewer than ten crime sites each. On the
other hand, five of the nine investigations involved more than twenty
crime sites, and the investigation in Darfur covered at least 100 crime
sites. Ultimately, it appears that the typical ICC investigation involves
190
between twenty and thirty separate crime sites.
The victims that are the subject of the ICC’s investigations are
overwhelmingly civilians. The ICC does not generally investigate the
191
killing of combatants. The only exceptions to this are the situation in
Mali, where the ICC investigated the unlawful killing of combatants after
they had been captured (i.e., the killing of combatants hors de combat)192
and the situation in Darfur where the Court investigated deliberate attacks
on UN peacekeepers.193 Other than this, the ICC has concentrated on
crimes committed against civilians. These civilian victims are often
members of vulnerable groups, like women and children. Moreover, the
victims are often targeted because of their actual or perceived membership
in disfavored ethnic or religious groups.
The number of victims of the incidents the ICC investigates varies by
the type of victimization. Although data on the number of people
displaced by the violence is missing for four of the situations, it is present
for the remaining five situations.194 And in these situations, the number of
civilians displaced by the violence ranges from hundreds of thousands to
more than a million. The number of other types of victims tends to be
190. More technically, the average number of crime sites per investigation was 29.4, while the
median number of crime sites is 24. Whether one uses the average or median, it seems accurate to say
that the typical ICC investigation includes between twenty and thirty crime sites.
191. See supra note 180 (noting that combatants are generally allowed to attack and kill other
combatants during an armed conflict).
192. Attacking or killing combatants hors de combat is a violation of international law. See supra
note 180.
193. See discussion supra Parts III.A.5, III.A.2.
194. It is unlawful to displace civilians from their homes through coercion as part of a widespread
or systematic attack on a civilian population. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(d) (noting that “[d]eportation
or forcible transfer of the population” is a crime against humanity); Id. art. 7(2)(d) (noting that this
includes the “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts”).
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smaller. Although the data on the number of civilians wounded during the
commission of the crimes under investigation is missing in six of the nine
195
situations, it seems the number of civilians wounded is typically in the
thousands.196
Widespread rape is a feature of most of the ICC’s investigations.197
198
While numbers are understandably vague at the pre-investigative phase,
it appears that the typical investigation covers crimes that involve the rape
of hundreds to thousands of people. Finally, the widespread murder of
civilians is also a hallmark of the ICC’s investigations.199 Indeed, Mali
stands out from the other investigations precisely because the ICC alleges
that only 100–200 murders occurred while all the other investigations that
provide specific estimates of the number of civilians murdered report
much higher figures. Five of the seven situations for which data are
available report more than a thousand murders. Consequently, it seems fair
to conclude that the typical ICC investigation involves investigating the
unlawful deaths of more than one thousand civilians.
The ICC’s investigations are also often marked by the extreme cruelty
of the crimes that are committed. Victims are not just killed, they are
mutilated or disemboweled.200 Women (and men) are not just raped, they
are gang raped or raped in public.201 Children are abducted and forced to
become fighters and sex slaves.202 The crimes are also often motivated by
195. This is not atypical. See Stuart Ford, The Complexity of International Criminal Trials Is
Necessary, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 151, 166 (noting that the indictments at the ICTY often
failed to contain detailed information on the number of individuals seriously injured during the alleged
crimes).
196. Inflicting injuries short of death on victims can be both a war crime and a crime against
humanity. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(k) (“intentionally causing . . . serious injury”); Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iii)
(“[w]ilfully causing . . . serious injury”).
197. Rape can be both a crime against humanity and a war crime. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(g)
(rape as a crime against humanity); Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii) (rape as a war crime).
198. The ICC usually indicates the number of rapes that have been “reported” to the authorities.
But it also frequently stresses that these numbers undercount the actual number of rapes that have
occurred because of poor reporting infrastructure and the stigma that is often attached to those who
report having been raped. See Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, Request for
authorization of an investigation pursuant to article 15, ¶ 2, 70 (June 23, 2011); Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ICC-10/09-3, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15,
¶ 56, 66 (Nov. 26, 2009); Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Background Situation in the Central African
Republic (May 22, 2007), 2; Office of the Prosecutor [OTP], Situation in the Central African Republic
II: Article 53(1) Report ¶ 180 (Sept. 24, 2014). Thus, the “true” number of rapes is likely much higher
than the figures in Table 1 suggest.
199. Murder can be both a war crime and a crime against humanity. See Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a)
(murder as a crime against humanity); Id. art. 8(2)(a)(i) (willful killing as a war crime).
200. See discussion supra Part III.A.5.
201. See discussion supra Part III.A.7.
202. See discussion supra Part III.A.9.
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discriminatory intent, as the perpetrators seek out and harm members of
particular ethnic or religious groups because of their membership in those
groups.
Finally, while there is some variation in how the crimes are legally
qualified by the OTP, there are also considerable similarities. Most
noticeably, the OTP has claimed that genocide occurred in only one of the
nine situations (Darfur). In one other situation (CAR II), it has said that
genocide may have occurred but that further investigation is needed. In the
remaining seven situations, genocide is not being considered. In contrast,
crimes against humanity are alleged in eight of the nine situations, while
war crimes are alleged in seven of the nine. Thus, the typical ICC
investigation involves both war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Genocide is rarely the subject of an investigation.
To put this all together, the typical ICC investigation covers a variety
of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the course of
an armed conflict. The ICC will usually investigate crimes committed at
between twenty and thirty separate crime sites over a period of several
months to several years. These crimes are typically carried out by
sophisticated, hierarchically organized armed groups, and the resulting
violence is systematic and widespread. In most cases, the ICC will
investigate more than one perpetrator group.
The typical ICC investigation will cover crimes that resulted in the
murder of more than a thousand people, the rape of anywhere from
hundreds to thousands of people, serious injury to thousands, and the
displacement by violence of hundreds of thousands to millions of people.
The victims of these crimes will overwhelmingly be civilians, including
many women and children. Usually, the perpetrators commit their crimes
with a discriminatory motive. Moreover, the violence is often carried out
in particularly cruel or brutal ways.
This shows that the typical ICC investigation involves crimes that are:
(1) massive in scale, involving large numbers of crime sites, long time
periods, and large numbers of victims; (2) terrible in nature, involving the
most serious forms of victimization like murder and rape; (3) carried out
in a horrific manner, almost always including the systematic and
widespread brutalization of the civilian population by organized groups
acting with a discriminatory motive and often also including acts of
exceptional cruelty; and (4) have an enormous impact on the victims and
their societies, resulting in the death or serious injury of thousands of
people, often causing widespread destruction, and forcing hundreds of
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thousands of people to flee the violence. Thus, applying the OTP’s
definition of gravity,203 we can conclude that the crimes the ICC
investigates are extremely grave. As a result, one would also expect them
to require significant resources to successfully investigate.204
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. See discussion supra Part II.C (arguing that crime gravity acts as a proxy for difficulty of
investigation).
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TABLE 1: GRAVITY OF ICC INVESTIGATIONS205
DRC

Darfur

Côte
D’Ivoire

Kenya

Mali

Libya

CAR I

CAR II

Uganda

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

4

3

2

2

5

1

1

2

1

Perpetrated by
armed groups?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of crime
sites

24

100

45

15

9

26

7

33

6

Temporal Scope

2 years

Nearly 5
years

5 months 2 months 5 months

2 weeks

6 months

About 2
years

Up to 2 years

Identity of victims

Civilians

Civilians
and UN
peacekeepers

Civilians Civilians Civilians Civilians
and
combatan
ts hors de
combat

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Number murdered

At least
1,000

Thousands At least
1,000

At least
1,100

100-200

Unknown

At least
2,600

Unknown

Number raped

Unknown

Thousands At least
hundreds

At least
900

50-100

Number wounded

Thousands

Unknown Unknown

More
than
3,500

Number displaced

At least
140,000

Hundreds
of
thousands

More
than 1
million

Exceptional
cruelty?

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Discriminatory
motive?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Type of crimes

WC and
CAH

CAH

Armed conflict?
Number of
perpetrator groups

WC,
WC and
CAH, and
CAH
genocide

At least
750

Unknown At least 600 Hundreds to
thousands

Unknown

Unknown Hundreds

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

About Unknown Unknown
350,000

Unknown

More than 1
million

Unknown

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

WC

CAH

WC and
CAH

WC, CAH, WC and CAH
and
possibly
genocide

C. The Gravity of Domestic Mass Atrocity Investigations
The next step is to compare the ICC’s investigations to investigations
of comparable gravity carried out in domestic systems. Comparable
investigations, however, are hard to find. One cannot compare the average
ICC investigation to the average criminal investigation in a domestic legal
system because they are of much lower gravity. For example, in the
205. The data for this table comes from Parts III.B.1 to III.B.9 above.
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United States, non-violent drug offenses are the most commonly charged
felonies, closely followed by non-violent property offenses.206 Only 23%
of felony defendants are accused of a violent crime and most of those are
207
charged with assault. Less than 1% of all felony charges in the United
States are for murder.208 Even when someone is accused of murder, they
209
are usually alleged to have murdered only one person. In short, the vast
majority of domestic criminal investigations do not come close to the
210
gravity of the ICC’s investigations.
There is, however, a class of cases in domestic systems that are
comparable in gravity to the ICC’s work—mass atrocity crimes. These
cases are extremely rare in most domestic systems, but they are the closest
comparators to the work of international criminal tribunals.211 For this
reason, this section will explore a selection of mass atrocity crimes in
domestic systems to see how they compare to the gravity of the typical
ICC investigation.
There is some disagreement about what the term “mass atrocity”
means. Some sources suggest that it has a predominantly legal meaning
and refers to certain international crimes such as genocide, war crimes,
212
and crimes against humanity. Others argue that the term should refer to
the scope of the violence rather than their legal qualification.213 For this
Article, mass atrocity is not used as a legal term. Rather, it refers to the
extent of the violence. Mass atrocity is defined as any extensive deliberate
violence against civilians, however it is characterized under domestic or
international law.214

206. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 3 (May 2010).

DEP’T

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See Ford, supra note 153, at 77.
210. See Stuart Ford, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, 29 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2014) (arguing that most domestic criminal cases look nothing like the cases
prosecuted by international criminal courts).
211. See Ford, supra note 210, at 59.
212. See Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (United Nations
2014) at 1 (arguing that “atrocity crimes” refers to crimes that constitute genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes).
213. Scott Strauss, Identifying Genocide and Related Forms of Mass Atrocity 1 (U. S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum, Working Paper Oct. 7, 2011), https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20111219identifying-genocide-and-mass-atrocity-strauss.pdf (noting that while some commentators define mass
atrocities as those that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, others use different
definitions that are tied to the scope of the violence rather than their legal qualification).
214. Cf. id. at 21.
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The following domestic mass atrocity cases were selected: (1) the 1988
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; (2) the 1993
World Trade Center bombing; (3) the 1995 bombing of a government
building in Oklahoma City; (4) the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in
Africa; (5) the 2005 London Underground bombings; (6) the shootings
and bombings committed by Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011; (7) the
shooting down of Malaysian Airways flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014;
and (8) the Paris attacks in November 2015. These cases were selected
based on two criteria. First, they involved intentional attacks on civilians
that resulted in a large number of victims and thus constitute mass atrocity
215
crimes. Second, information was publicly available about the domestic
criminal investigations that were undertaken. This latter point is very
important. Governments do not routinely make information public about
the size, scope, or cost of domestic criminal investigations. Thus, the
selection of cases was constrained by the availability of information that
could be used to compare the size and scope of domestic mass atrocity
216
investigations to the ICC’s investigations.
The selection of cases was also constrained by the availability of
source material in English. This reliance on English-language sources
naturally led to the inclusion of a number of incidents that occurred in the
United States and Britain. An attempt was made to find incidents from
other countries to balance this. Ultimately, incidents involving Norway,
the Netherlands, and France were also included. Even after an attempt to
broaden the scope of the incidents beyond the United States and Britain,
however, there is still a bias towards wealthy Western democracies.
This bias means that the information collected below in Parts III.C.1–
III.C.8 is not necessarily representative of all states’ responses to mass
atrocity crimes. For example, it is likely that developing countries react
differently to mass atrocities. Among other differences, given their lower
GDP’s, they probably do not devote the same level of resources to mass
atrocity investigations that Western democracies do. It proved difficult,
however, to find reliable public information on mass atrocity
215. See supra text accompanying note 214 (defining mass atrocity crimes). The 1993 World
Trade Center bombing had a relatively small number of victims and thus does not seem to meet the
definition of a mass atrocity crime, but it would have had thousands of victims if the attackers had
accomplished their objectives, see infra note 225, and it makes sense to think of it as an attempted
mass atrocity crime.
216. For example, the 2004 Madrid train bombings were considered for inclusion in this Article
but were ultimately excluded because it was very difficult to find information about the size, scope or
cost of the investigation in English.
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investigations in developing countries. This bias is unfortunate but
difficult to avoid or compensate for.
1. Lockerbie Plane Bombing
On December 22, 1988, Pan Am flight 103 fell out of the sky and
217
crashed to the ground near the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. All 259
passengers and crew on board the plane died, as did eleven residents of the
town of Lockerbie who were killed by the falling debris.218 The cause of
219
the crash was the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.
The investigation initially focused on a terrorist group as possible
perpetrators before eventually shifting to agents of the Libyan
government.220 The British government prosecuted two Libyan nationals
for involvement in the bombing, although it has recently indicated that that
221
it has evidence against two other Libyan nationals.
2. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
On February 26, 1993, a small group of terrorists drove a rented van
containing a homemade bomb into the parking lot under the World Trade
Center Complex.222 Shortly thereafter the bomb detonated killing six
people and injuring more than a thousand.223 The bomb also caused
224
While the
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of property damage.
bomb only caused six deaths, the goal of the bombers was to collapse both
towers of the World Trade Center.225 If they had succeeded, there would

217. See Her Majesty’s Advocate v. Al Megrahi et. al., Trial Judgment, Case No. 1475/99, High
Court of Justiciary, ¶ 1 [hereinafter Lockerbie Trial Judgment].
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 2.
220. See Rt. Hon. Colin Boyd QC, Politics, Crime and Criminal Justice: The Lockerbie Trial, Int’l
Soc’y for the Reform of Crim. L., 15th Int’l Conf. Canberra, Austl. 4–6 (Aug. 26–30, 2001) (on file
with author) (noting that the investigation first focused on a terrorist group known as the PGLPGC
before eventually turning to Libya) [hereinafter Lockerbie Trial].
221. See Sewell Chan, 2 Lockerbie Bombing Suspects, Libyans, Sought by U.S. and Scotland,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/europe/lockerbie-bombinglibya.html?_r=0.
222. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir. 1998).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. First Strike: Global Terror in America, FBI (Feb. 26, 2008), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.
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have been a much larger number of casualties. Six individuals participated
in the plot.226
3. Oklahoma City Bombing
On April 19, 1995, an explosion severely damaged the Murrah
Building in Oklahoma City.227 The bomb killed 168 people, including
nineteen children, and injured hundreds more.228 The attack was largely
the work of two individuals, although others knew about the plan.229
4. U.S. Embassy Bombings
On August 7, 1998, bombs were detonated nearly simultaneously
outside U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam,
230
“Two-hundred and twenty-four people died” in the
Tanzania.
explosions “and more than 4,500 people were wounded.”231 The
investigation focused on a small number of terrorist groups with the
sophistication and motivation to carry out the attacks.232 Relatively
quickly, it became clear that the bombing was the work of a terrorist group
backed by Osama bin Laden.233

226. See Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, supra note 222, at 107–08 (indicating that the participants in the
plot were Ramzi Yousef, Ahmad Ajaj, Mohammed Salameh, Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima,
and Adbul Yasin).
227. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir. 1998).
228. Id. at 1176–77.
229. Id. at 1177–78.
230. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Bombings in East Africa: The Overview; Bombs Rip Apart 2
U.S. Embassies in Africa; Scores Killed; No Firm Motive or Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-east-africa-overview-bombs-rip-apart-2-usembassies-africa-scores.html.
231. East African Embassy Bombings, In Famous Cases & Criminals, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/
history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings.
232. See Philip Shenon, Bombings in East Africa: In Washington; Focus on Suspects in Past
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-in-eastafrica-in-washington-focus-on-suspects-in-past-attacks.html.
233. See President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan (Aug. 20, 1998), in U.S. Fury on 2 Continents; Clinton’s Words:
‘There Will Be No Sanctuary for Terrorists’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/08/21/world/us-fury-2-continents-clinton-s-words-there-will-be-no-sanctuary-for-terrorists.html
(quoting President Clinton as saying, “There is convincing information from our intelligence
community that the bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings.”); James Risen,
U.S. Seeks Means to Bring Suspect from Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/20/world/us-seeks-means-to-bring-suspect-from-afghanistan.html;
David Johnston, U.S. Says Suspect Does Not Admit Role in Bombings or Ties to Saudi, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/18/world/us-says-suspect-does-not-admit-role-inbombings-or-ties-to-saudi.html.
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5. London Train Bombings
234

On July 7, 2005, four bombs were detonated in London.
Three
exploded inside trains, and the fourth was set off inside a crowded bus.235
The bombs killed fifty-six people, including the four bombers, and injured
236
more than 700. From very early on, the attacks were treated as resulting
from terrorism.237 The investigation subsequently suggested that the
bombers had met with and perhaps received some training from members
238
of Al Qaida.
6. Norway Attacks 2011
In July 2011, Anders Breivik killed seventy-seven people and severely
239
wounded forty-two more in attacks that took place in Norway.
The
attacks took place at two different locations, with the first attack consisting
of a bomb that damaged government buildings in the center of Oslo and
the second attack consisting of shootings at a summer camp for youth
members of the governing Labour Party.240 The attacks were the work of
241
an individual right-wing extremist,
although there was some initial
242
concern that Breivik was working with other extremists.

234. See HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON
7TH JULY 2005, 2005-6, HC 1087, ¶ 2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf.
235. Id. ¶ 2-3.
236. Id. ¶ 2.
237. Id. ¶ 4.
238. Id. ¶ 42-45.
239. See Cecilia H. Leonard et al., The Case of Anders Breivik—Language of a Lone Terrorist, 32
BEHAV. SCI. L. 408, 408 (2014); Walter Gibbs & Elinor Schang, Norway Police to Track Killer’s
Funds in Year-Long Probe, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-5860
7220110803.
240. See Elisa Mala & J. David Goodman, At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html.
241. See generally Leonard et al., supra note 239. See also Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, Oslo
Suspect Wrote of Fear of Islam and Plan for War, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/24/world/europe/24oslo.html; Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, As Horrors Emerge,
Norway Charges Christian Extremist, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9E01E5DE143FF937A15754C0A9679D8B63&pagewanted=print.
242. See Norway: Anders Behring Breivik Claims ‘Two More Cells’, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14280210.
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7. Crash of MH17 over Ukraine
On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was struck by a
surface to air missile while flying over eastern Ukraine.243 The plane
crashed and all 298 people aboard were killed.244 While other possibilities
were considered, it is reasonably certain that the cause of the crash was a
245
surface to air missile fired from a Buk missile launcher. The flight was
shot down over an area that was controlled by separatist groups who were
engaged in an armed conflict with the government of Ukraine.246 The
investigation has focused on the involvement of Ukrainian rebel groups
with the assistance or support of Russia.247
8. Paris Attacks 2015
On the evening of November 13, 2015, there was a series of
coordinated attacks on civilians in Paris.248 The attacks took place over a
period of about three hours and were carried out by three groups of
attackers.249 It appears that nine or ten people were directly involved in the
250
attacks. There were three attacks at a stadium where a soccer match was
being played, four attacks at restaurants, and an attack on a rock
concert.251 More than 120 people were killed and hundreds more injured
252
in the attacks. Very early on, it became clear that the attacks were the

243. See DUTCH SAFETY BOARD, CRASH OF MALAYSIA AIRLINES FLIGHT MH17 HRABOVE,
UKRAINE 17 JULY 2014, 9 (Oct. 2015), https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/uploads/phase-docs/1006/
debcd724fe7breport-mh17-crash.pdf.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 10.
247. See Nicola Clark & Andrew E. Kramer, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 Most Likely Hit by
Russian-Made Missile, Inquiry Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/
14/world/europe/mh17-malaysia-airlines-dutch-report.html; Somini Sengupta & Andrew E. Kramer,
Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
28, 2016).
248. See Adam Nossiter & Rick Gladstone, Paris Attacks Kill More Than 100, Police Say; Border
Controls Tightened, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/world/europe/
paris-shooting-attacks.html.
249. See Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of Coordinated Attackers Carried Out Assault on
Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html?mtrref=query.nytimes.com.
250. See Paris Attacks: The Investigation So Far, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-34822265.
251. See Three Hours of Terror in Paris, Moment by Moment, N.Y. TIMES (updated Nov. 15,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/13/world/europe/paris-shooting-attacks.html?rref=
collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fattacks-in-paris.
252. Id.
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work of a group inspired by and possibly assisted by an Islamic extremist
group called ISIS.253
D. Comparing Domestic Mass Atrocity Crime Investigations to ICC
Investigations
The descriptions of the mass atrocity crimes above shed some light on
what the typical mass atrocity crime investigation in a Western democracy
looks like. This information is summarized in Table 2 below. Unless
otherwise indicated, all information in this Section comes from the data in
Table 2.
On the whole, the domestic crimes appear to be less grave than the
crimes the ICC usually investigates. First, all the domestic mass atrocity
crimes took place either at a single point in time or over a very small
period of time. In contrast, the average ICC investigation covers events
that occur over months and years.254 The domestic investigations also
involve a smaller number of crime sites. The incident with the largest
number of crime sites, the Paris attacks in 2015, took place at eight
locations. Most of the other domestic incidents took place at one or two
places. The typical ICC investigation, on the other hand, involves between
twenty and thirty crime sites.255
There is also a difference in the size and number of the perpetrator
groups. While one of the domestic mass atrocity crimes was committed by
an individual (the attacks in Norway), the majority were committed by
small groups of individuals working together. Only one incident, the
shooting down of MH17 by Ukrainian rebels, involved an attack carried
out by an armed group. In contrast, almost all of the ICC’s investigations
involve either large armed groups or the official armed forces of the
state.256 In addition, all the domestic investigations involved a single
perpetrator group. The ICC is often investigating multiple perpetrator
groups committing violent acts in the same country at the same time.257
While the victims of both the ICC’s investigations and domestic mass
atrocity investigations are overwhelmingly civilians, there is a difference
in the number of victims. The ICC’s investigations typically involve the
deaths of a thousand or more individuals, injuries to thousands more, and
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See Nossiter et al., supra note 249.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the displacement by violence of hundreds of thousands of people.258 They
also usually involve systematic rape of the civilian population.259 As
terrible as the domestic mass atrocity crimes described above are, they
typically result in hundreds of deaths and hundreds of serious injuries.
While the number of victims is not the only measure of a crime’s gravity,
260
it is a significant factor, and the ICC’s investigations typically involve
many more victims than the domestic investigations. They also involve
types of victimization (rape and forcible displacement) that are not present
in the domestic investigations.
Much like at the ICC, a discriminatory motive is a feature of these
mass atrocity crimes. But, unlike the ICC, none of the domestic crimes
exhibit the exceptional cruelty that is present in a significant portion of the
ICC’s investigations. While both the ICC and the domestic investigations
involved large numbers of deaths, the ICC’s investigations often involved
acts of exceptional cruelty like forced amputations, death by
disemboweling, and the sexual mutilation of rape victims.261
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 109.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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TABLE 2: GRAVITY OF DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS262
Lockerbie

WTC

OK City

Embassies

London

Norway

MH17

Paris

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Number of
perpetrator
groups?

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Number of
perpetrators
directly
involved?

4

6

2

Unknown

4

1

Unknown

9 or 10

Number of
crime sites?

1

1

1

2

4

2

1

8

Temporal
Scope

1 day

1 day

1 day

1 day

1 day

1 day

1 day

1 day

Identity of
Victims

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Civilians

Number
murdered

259

6

168

224

56

77

298

120

Number
raped

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Number
wounded

0
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Hundreds

More than
4,500
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700

42

0

Hundreds

Number
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0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Exceptional
cruelty?

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Discriminato
ry motive?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Armed
conflict?

Gravity is a function of the scale of the crimes, the nature of the
crimes, the manner in which they are committed, and their impact on the
victims and their communities.263 Taken together, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that the typical ICC investigation covers crimes of greater
gravity than the typical domestic mass atrocity investigation.264 The ICC’s
investigations typically involve crimes of a larger scale than domestic
investigations because they involve a longer time period during which the
crimes take place, a larger number of crime sites, and a larger number of
262. The data for this table comes from Part III.C.1–8 above.
263. See discussion supra Part II.A (defining gravity).
264. Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the ICC, which was set up to
investigate and prosecute those responsible for “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole[.]” Rome Statute, supra note 28, Preamble. The Court was designed to address
the most “grave crimes” that are committed, crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of
the world.” Id.
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victims.265 The nature of the crimes investigated by the ICC is also graver.
While both the ICC and the domestic mass atrocity investigations involve
large numbers of deliberate killings, the ICC’s investigations also usually
involve rape, torture, inhumane treatment, and other serious wrongs.266
The manner in which both sets of crimes is carried out is similar in that
all of the ICC’s investigations and all but one of the domestic
investigations have involved groups of people working together to carry
out planned attacks upon civilians. They represent acts of organized
violence.267 The ICC’s investigations, however, often involve acts of
exceptional cruelty that are not present in the domestic mass atrocities.268
The impact of the crimes investigated by the ICC is also graver than the
impact of the domestic crimes.269 For example, one hallmark of the ICC’s
investigation is that the violence and destruction causes hundreds of
thousands of people to flee their homes in search of safety. This forcible
displacement has an enormous impact on the victims and their
communities.270 Another hallmark of the crimes the ICC investigates is
271
that the violence causes a breakdown in state institutions.
In contrast,
large-scale displacement of the civilian population and the breakdown of
state institutions were not present in any of the domestic mass atrocity
crimes. Consequently, the ICC has typically investigated crimes of greater
gravity than those investigated in domestic settings. Thus, the ICC’s
investigations should require greater investigative resources than the
272
domestic mass atrocity investigations because of their greater gravity.
But even if the domestic mass atrocity crimes were of the same gravity
as the ICC’s investigations, the ICC might still need more resources
because there are reasons to believe that international investigations are
intrinsically more difficult than domestic investigations even for crimes of
the same gravity. First, the OTP must allocate sufficient investigative
265. See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing how the scale of the crimes is evaluated).
266. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing how the nature of the crimes is evaluated).
267. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing now the manner the crimes are committed
is evaluated).
268. Id.
269. See supra text accompanying note 45 (discussing how the impact of the crimes is evaluated).
270. See, e.g., James M. Shultz et al., Internally Displaced “Victims of Armed Conflict” in
Colombia: The Trajectory and Trauma Signature of Forced Migration, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY
REP. 475 (2014) (noting that “IDPs [internally displaced persons] experience extraordinary adversities,
overt danger, and psychological distress throughout all phases along the trajectory of displacement,
leading to chronic elevation of risks for victimization, physical ailments, and mental disorders”).
271. See infra text accompanying note 280.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 138–57 (arguing that the scope and gravity of the acts
being investigated acts as a proxy for the investigative resources needed to adequately investigate
those acts).
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resources to establish the jurisdictional prerequisites of war crimes and
crimes against humanity,273 requirements that are generally unnecessary
for domestic prosecutions. The ICC also generally lacks the coercive
274
Unlike most domestic investigations, ICC
powers that states possess.
investigators will often lack control of the crime scene and will not be able
275
to compel the testimony of witnesses or the collection of documents. In
addition, certain investigative techniques used in comparable domestic
investigations may not be available in ICC investigations.276 Instead, the
ICC is dependent on state cooperation and the willingness of individuals to
277
be witnesses to build their cases.
Unfortunately, state cooperation is
278
often withheld
and witnesses often refuse to participate in the
279
investigation.
In addition, the ICC will often be investigating either
during or shortly after “intense political and social upheavals”
characterized by widespread violence and a breakdown in state
280
The
resulting
instability
further
complicates
institutions.
investigations.281 In contrast, while all of the domestic mass atrocities

273. See supra text accompanying notes 143–47.
274. See Alex Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, 76 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 174 (2013); Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive
Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal
Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 403, 405–08 (2004).
275. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 174. See also Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016–
2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 24 (July 6, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/
070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting that lack of access to the crime scene
immediately after the crime is committed decreases the quality of evidence and leads that can be
obtained); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406–07.
276. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2012–2015, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
¶ 19 (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf (noting that the
OTP is usually unable to use “[s]pecialized investigative techniques” that are often used in national
jurisdictions like “interception of voice and electronic communication”).
277. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 174.
278. Id. at 183–85 (noting that state cooperation is “largely outside the control of the [OTP] and is
highly variable and unpredictable”); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 413–21 (describing the
difficulty of obtaining cooperation from recalcitrant states).
279. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 181–82 (noting that “insider witnesses” are often reluctant to
cooperate because of concerns about their safety, that witnesses may be intimidated by the subjects of
the investigation, and that “at no time can the prosecution compel witnesses to come to the court and
testify”); Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 407 (noting that witnesses are often reluctant to
cooperate with the court because of fear that the perpetrators—who are often members of the police or
military—will harm them or their families).
280. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 180.
281. Id.; see also Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406 (“Investigating a crime in an area in
which armed conflict still rages or has recently terminated is obviously logistically more complicated
[than most domestic investigations].”); Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 430 (2004) (noting the difficulties of conducting a criminal investigation
during an armed conflict, including lack of access to documents, crime scenes and witnesses).
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discussed in this Article were grave crimes, none of them resulted in the
widespread breakdown of state institutions. Moreover, as some former
international prosecutors have noted, sometimes even simply identifying
that a crime has taken place and locating the crime scene can be very
282
difficult —a problem that none of the domestic mass atrocity
investigations have faced. For these reasons, even if the scope and gravity
of domestic and ICC investigations were the same—which they are not—
the ICC’s investigations would probably still be more difficult and require
more resources.
IV. THE INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS
Given that the ICC’s investigations generally involve a higher degree
of gravity and therefore a higher level of difficulty than domestic mass
atrocity crimes, one would expect that the ICC has investigative resources
equivalent to or exceeding that which states devote to the investigation of
domestic mass atrocity crimes. This section explores that issue in more
detail by looking at the ICC’s resources and comparing that to the
resources that states devote to domestic mass atrocity crimes.
A. The ICC’s Investigative Resources
In August 2015, the OTP released a blueprint for its future: The Report
of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter
the Basic Size document).283 In it the OTP laid out what it views as the
minimum investigative resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. It is
important to note what this does and does not include. First, and most
importantly, the Basic Size document does not describe the resources
available to the ICC at this time. Indeed, the document notes that
achieving the goals in the Basic Size document will require substantial
expansion of the OTP, including a 33% increase in the OTP’s staff and a
284
43% increase in its budget, relative to 2015 levels. The OTP stated that

282. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 274, at 406.
283. International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Court on the Basic
Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-ASP/14/21 (Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Basic Size
document]. In the interests of full disclosure, the Author worked in the Office of the Prosecutor during
the Summer of 2015 and contributed to some parts of the Basic Size document. The Author did not,
however, contribute to those parts of the document that describe the investigative resources the ICC
needs to meets its mandate.
284. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 15, at 5.
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this increase in resources is necessary to avoid “the present unsustainable
practice of repeatedly postponing new investigations which must be
pursued in accordance with the Office’s mandate, or constantly stripping
ongoing activities of critical resources so as to staff the highest prioritised
285
activities.”
At the same time, the resources requested in the Basic Size document
are not extravagant. The Court is not asking for sufficient resources to
respond to every demand on it, what it refers to as a “full demand” driven
approach to budgeting.286 Rather, it seeks a situation where the OTP “will
be able to adequately respond—with a reasonable degree of
[prioritization]—to demands for its intervention without undermining
quality and efficiency.”287 According to the Court, funding of the ICC
consistent with the Basic Size document will result in a pace of
investigative activities that will remain “below the level of full
288
demand.”
The Basic Size document then goes on to explain what investigative
resources the ICC would like to be able to devote to an average
289
investigation. An average ICC investigation will take three years. The
first six months is a start-up phase where the investigative team reviews
the material gathered during the preliminary examination, “studies the
culture and context of the country,” and conducts missions to set up
290
logistics and security arrangements.
The investigation then enters what the OTP calls the “full
investigation” phase.291 During this phase, the investigative team spends
approximately two years collecting the evidence necessary to send the case
292
for trial.
Although the OTP is focusing on diversifying its evidence
293
collection to include forms of evidence beyond witness statements,

285. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 3, at 3; see also id. at 3 n.2 (noting that the
unexpected arrest of three outstanding fugitives had hampered ongoing investigations and led to the
postponement of several new investigations).
286. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 24, at 9 (describing a “full” demand-driven
approach).
287. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 5, at 3; see also id. ¶¶ 25–26, at 9–10.
288. See id. ¶ 5, at 3.
289. See id. ¶ 9, at 29.
290. See id. ¶ 10, at 29.
291. See id. ¶ 11, at 29.
292. See id.
293. For example, the OTP is increasingly relying on “satellite imagery, cyber investigations,
telecommunications data, crime scene investigations (CSI), [and] financial investigations” to develop
its cases. Id. ¶ 32, at 46.
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witness statements are still a key part of the investigative process.294 Prior
experience has shown that the OTP requires about fifty to sixty witnesses
to appear in Court during an average trial.295 Given, however, that many
witnesses are unavailable at trial for various reasons, including witness
intimidation, the goal is to conduct approximately 170 witness interviews
to be sure that fifty to sixty witnesses will be available to testify at trial.296
It is anticipated that it will take the investigative team two years to screen
297
298
all of the potential witnesses, identify those that will be interviewed,
and take witness statements from the 170 or so witnesses that are
299
necessary for the case to be ready for trial. The OTP will also collect
between fifteen and twenty thousand pieces of non-testimonial evidence
during an average investigation.300
After the necessary witness statements (and other evidence) have been
collected, there is a wrap-up phase of approximately six months. During
this phase, the OTP develops measures to maintain contact with its
witnesses and ensure their protection. It also either begins to prepare the
case for trial (if an arrest is expected imminently or a suspect is in
custody) or prepares the case to be hibernated (if no arrest is expected).301
The whole process is expected to take about three years.
The number of staff assigned to the investigative team varies over time.
While fewer personnel are assigned to the investigation during the start-up
294. See id. ¶ 11, at 29. See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 181 (noting that due to the lack of
non-witness evidence in the situations the ICC investigates, witnesses—particularly insider
witnesses—“will continue to be at the center of nearly all cases at the ICC”); but see Office of the
Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 25 (July 6, 2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting that the
widespread availability of phones with the capacity to take photographs and record video as well as
access to the internet has made some types of electronic evidence more accessible). See also id. ¶ 23
(noting that satellite imagery is also now more widely available).
295. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, ¶ 12, at 30.
296. See id.
297. On average, only about half of those who are screened by the OTP are formally interviewed.
Id. ¶ 13, at 30–31.
298. The OTP indicates that a thorough witness interview takes, on average, about four days to
complete. Id. ¶ 11, at 29.
299. See id. ¶ 13, at 30–31.
300. This figure comes from a comparison of the table in paragraph 33 of Annex II of the Basic
Size document, which indicates that the last three investigations have produced 50,000 non-testimonial
pieces of evidence (or about 16,700 pieces per investigation) and the statement in paragraph 35 that the
OTP anticipates collecting about 10,000 pieces of non-testimonial evidence per year during the full
investigation phase (or about 20,000 per investigation). See id. ¶¶ 33, 35, at 46–47.
301. See id. at Annex I, ¶ 18.
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and wrap-up phases,302 the investigative team reaches a peak size of thirty
personnel towards the end of the full investigation phase.303 At its largest,
the investigation team will have thirteen investigators.304 These are the
individuals that collect the evidence and conduct witness interviews. In
addition, there are four individuals who input the data collected during the
investigation into the various databases used to track the course of the
305
investigation.
Each team will also have three analysts who provide
guidance to the investigators, identify additional lines of inquiry, and
assess the quality of the evidence collected.306 The investigation team is
also supplemented with up to nine personnel from the Prosecution
307
Division that provide legal guidance to the investigation.
This latter
308
group includes lawyers, legal assistants, and case managers.
Finally,
one person is assigned from the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and
Cooperation Division to provide assistance on matters that require the
309
cooperation of states.
While the formal investigative team peaks at thirty personnel,310 that
number may be supplemented with a small number of additional personnel
as needed for particular specialized tasks. For example, personnel from the
Scientific Response Unit provide forensic support to the investigations on
an as-needed basis.311 The Operational Support Unit helps design field
operations so as to minimize risk and maintain security and
confidentiality.312 These additional personnel do not significantly increase
the size of the investigation team. For example, the Scientific Response
Unit has only fifteen personnel, who are expected to split their time
between at least six ongoing investigations.313 The Basic Size document
envisions that each active investigation will be assigned one person for
314
forensic work and one person for “cyber investigations.”
The

302. Sixteen personnel are assigned to the investigation during the start-up phase, and twenty
personnel are assigned during the wrap-up phase. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25.
303. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25.
304. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 30–31. See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 176 (noting that the typical
ICC investigation used at most twelve investigators).
305. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, at Annex II, ¶ 35–36.
306. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 37–38.
307. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 40.
308. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 47.
309. See id. at Annex II, ¶ 25.
310. See supra text accompanying note 303.
311. See Basic Size document, supra note 283, at Annex III, ¶ 8–9.
312. See id. at Annex III, ¶ 4–7.
313. See id. at 68.
314. Id.
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Operational Support Unit envisions that three people will be assigned to
each active investigation to contribute to operational planning.315 Thus,
these additional personnel may bring the actual number of OTP staff
working on each investigation at its peak to thirty-five.
Thus, according to the model laid out in the Basic Size document, the
average ICC investigation is expected to take about three years and result
in the screening of about 350 potential witnesses, the taking of about 170
witness statements, and the collection of about 20,000 other pieces of
evidence.316 This investigation is undertaken by a team that varies in size
between sixteen and thirty-five people. But even at its peak, the team only
has thirteen actual investigators.317 This information is summarized below
in Table 3.
TABLE 3: THE ICC’S INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES318

ICC

Peak
Personnel

Number of Witness
Interviews

Pieces of Evidence Collected

35

About 170

About 20,000

It is important to remember, however, that this does not describe the
investigative resources the ICC actually has right now. This is what the
ICC is asking the member states to provide in the future so it has sufficient
resources to conduct “adequate” investigations in situations where its
319
mandate requires it to respond. The ICC’s actual investigative resources
right now are significantly smaller than what is laid out in the Basic Size
document.320

315. Id. at 67 (noting that “3 persons per active investigation” are assigned).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 289–300.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 302–15.
318. The data in this table comes from Part IV.A above. It represents the investigative resources
assigned to an average ICC investigation.
319. See supra note 287 (noting that the goal of the OTP was to be able to “adequately respond”
to investigative demands without “undermining quality and efficiency”).
320. See supra note 284 (noting that the OTP could only achieve the goals in the Basic Size
document with a significant increase in its present resources).
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B. Domestic Investigative Resources
Having looked at the investigative resources available to the ICC, this
section will explore domestic mass atrocity investigations. The
information below attempts to get a sense of the resources that states
devote to investigating mass atrocity crimes. Data was collected—where
available—on three factors: (1) the number of personnel assigned to the
investigation; (2) the number of witness interviews conducted; and (3) the
number of pieces of evidence collected. These factors were chosen
because they act as indicators of the resources dedicated to the
investigations. This data will then be compared to the resources available
to the ICC.
1. Lockerbie bombing
According to the Lockerbie trial judgment, “[a]fter the disaster a
massive police operation was mounted to recover as much as possible of
321
the debris in order to ascertain the cause of the crash.” This included a
322
“massive ground search,” with investigators “comb[ing] the countryside
323
on hands and knees looking for clues in virtually every blade of grass.”
324
The ground search involved at least 1,500 personnel.
“Tens of
thousands of items were recovered, sifted and recorded, and any that
appeared to be of particular interest as indicating a possible cause of the
325
explosion were examined by the relevant specialists.” All of the parts of
the aircraft that were recovered were subsequently used to reconstruct it
“as far as possible.”326
Investigators also devoted enormous resources to locating and
interviewing potential witnesses, ultimately interviewing more than 10,000
321. See Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 3.
322. Id. ¶ 9.
323. A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, FBI (Dec. 19,
2003), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/december/panam121903.
324. By the end of the first week after the crash, more than 600 personnel were involved in the
search. See Sheila Rule, Powerful Bomb Destroyed Pan Am Jet Over Scotland, British Investigation
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/29/world/powerful-bombdestroyed-pan-am-jet-over-scotland-british-investigation-finds.html. By January of 1988, more than
1,500 personnel were involved in the search. See Steve Lohr, Thatcher at Rites for Crash Victims,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/05/world/thatcher-at-rites-for-crashvictims.html. At that time, the Scottish police said the search would continue “indefinitely.” Id.
325. Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 3.
326. Id. ¶ 4.
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people in “dozens of countries.”327 The investigation also included
recreating the explosion by detonating plastic explosives inside a radio
cassette player placed inside a garment filled suitcase that was itself placed
inside a metal container similar to that used to load the luggage on Flight
328
103. This was done to demonstrate that the damage to the objects in the
test was consistent with the damage to the recovered fragments of the
plane and its contents. Various components of the downed plane were also
subjected to extensive laboratory testing to identify the presence of
explosive residue.329
The investigation began shortly after the crash and lasted at least
through May of 1991.330 This means the investigation lasted at least two
and half years. It also involved collecting evidence in numerous locations
beyond Scotland.331 The Scottish police also received assistance from the
332
FBI, the Swiss police, the French authorities, and the German police.
The personnel requirements of the investigation quickly overwhelmed the
local police force, which was augmented by officers from all over
333
Scotland and England.
It also overwhelmed local financial resources,
and the central government stepped in to pay for the costs of the
investigation and trial.334
2. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
The investigation was a joint effort of the New York Police
Department, the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
335
(ATF). The initial investigation of the scene of the bombing involved

327. A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, supra note 323.
See also Pan Am Flight 103 Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/
world/pan-am-flight-103-fast-facts/ (noting that more than 15,000 people in 30 countries were
interviewed).
328. Lockerbie Trial Judgment, supra note 217, ¶ 6.
329. Id. ¶ 7.
330. Id. ¶ 14 (noting that investigative activities were still being undertaken in May 1991).
331. Id. ¶ 12 (noting that police visited Malta to collect evidence); id. ¶ 14 (noting that police
collected evidence in Switzerland).
332. Id. ¶ 14 (FBI and Swiss police); id. ¶ 52 (French authorities); id. ¶¶ 59, 73 (German police
force). See also A Byte Out of History: Solving a Complex Case of International Terrorism, supra note
323.
333. Lockerbie Trial, supra note 217, at 3.
334. Id.
335. Robert D. McFadden, Crisis at the Twin Towers: The Explosion; Officials Studying Bomb
Clues Seek Several for Questioning, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/
01/nyregion/crisis-twin-towers-explosion-officials-studying-bomb-clues-seek-several-for.html?page
wanted=all.
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more than seventy agents from the FBI, ATF, and the New York Police
Department’s bomb squad who entered the bomb crater to search for
336
While the number of individuals who worked on the
evidence.
investigation from the ATF and the New York Police Department is
unknown, the FBI has said that at least 700 FBI agents participated in the
investigation.337
3. Oklahoma City Bombing
Relatively little information is available about the resources committed
by state and local law enforcement to the investigation, but the federal
government contributed substantial resources. The federal response was
led by the FBI in conjunction with the Department of Justice, the ATF, as
338
well as the military and local authorities. By the day after the explosion,
the FBI had sent “four evidence response teams and explosive ordnance
teams.”339 The ATF had sent two national response teams and a mobile
command center and the Secret Service had sent explosives experts.340
The Attorney General indicated that the FBI had fifty more personnel that
would arrive the next day and that the ATF would send another twenty to
341
twenty-five personnel.
She promised that the government would “use
342
every possible resource to bring the people responsible to justice.”
And indeed, the resources available to the investigation grew
enormously over time. Nearly 2,600 FBI agents worked on the
investigation during 1995.343 While the number of investigators decreased
over time, three years later, there were still more than 200 FBI agents
working on the case.344 According to the FBI, “no stone was left unturned

336. Joseph B. Treaster, The Twin Towers; Leading Bomb Specialists Sift Explosion Aftermath,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/04/nyregion/the-twin-towers-leadingbomb-specialists-sift-explosion-aftermath.html.
337. FBI 100; First Strike: Global Terror in America, FBI (Feb. 26, 2008), https://www.fbi.gov/
news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.
338. See Terror in Oklahoma City: Official Response, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/20/us/terror-oklahoma-city-official-response-statements-presidentattorney-general.html.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Howard Pankratz, Bomb Trials Costs $82.5 Million, DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 3, 1998),
http://extras.denverpost.com/bomb/bomb1103.htm.
344. Id. (noting that 2,592 FBI agents worked on the investigation in 1995, 760 in 1996, 552 in
1997, and 228 in 1998).
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to make sure every clue was found and all the culprits identified.”345
During the course of the investigation, the FBI interviewed more than
28,000 people, followed more than 43,000 leads, and collected and
346
reviewed more than a billion pieces of information.
4. U.S. Embassy Bombings
Investigators arrived from the United States shortly after the bombings
347
to begin looking for clues. The initial team assigned to the investigation
of the Kenya bombing included forty-five FBI agents, eleven CIA agents,
and “scores of military intelligence officers and State Department security
experts.”348 Within a week, the FBI contingent had risen to 120 agents,
349
The investigation involved
with sixty assigned to each bombing site.
searching the area surrounding the blasts, often on hands and knees,
looking for clues350 and trying to reconstruct the vehicles destroyed by the
bomb to identify the one that contained it.351 Ultimately, more than 900
FBI agents and many more FBI employees traveled to the sites of the
bombings to collect evidence and track down the perpetrators.352 This

345. See Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/
famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
346. Id.
347. Jane Perlez, Bombings in East Africa: In Dar Es Salaam; U.S. Experts Arrive to Study Clues
that Killed 9, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/09/world/bombings-eastafrica-dar-es-salaam-us-experts-arrive-study-clues-blast-that.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fjaneperlez&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=s
earc. See also Tim Weiner, Bombings in East Africa: The Overview; Experts Starting Search for Clues
in Kenya Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/10/world/
bombings-east-africa-overview-experts-starting-search-for-clues-kenya-bombing.html.
348. Weiner, supra note 347.
349. Id.
350. Raymond Bonner, Bombings in East Africa: The Search; As Rescuers’ Final Hopes Fade,
Investigators’ Toil Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/11/world/
bombings-east-africa-search-rescuers-final-hopes-fade-investigators-toil-begins.html.
351. James McKinley Jr., Bombings in East Africa: In Nairobi; FBI Sifts Vehicles’ Scraps from
Debris for Blast Clues, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/world/
bombings-east-africa-nairobi-fbi-sifts-vehicles-scraps-debris-for-blast-clues.html; see Tim Weiner &
Raymond Bonner, Bombings in East Africa: The Investigation in Kenya; FBI Reports Finding Pieces
of Bomb Truck, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/14/world/bombingseast-africa-investigation-kenya-fbi-reports-finding-pieces-bomb-truck.html; see Jane Perlez, In Tanzania,
Vehicle Debris Yielding Clues, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/16/
world/in-tanzania-vehicle-debris-yielding-clues.html.
352. East African Embassy Bombings, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/eastafrican-embassy-bombings (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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eventually led to the arrest of suspects in Pakistan.353 The investigation
was described at the time as the largest overseas investigation that had
ever been carried out by the U.S. and similar in “size and composition” to
the investigations of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995
354
Oklahoma City bombing.
5. London Train Bombings
The investigation of the London train bombings was described by the
355
UK government as “enormous” and it involved a “massive police and
356
intelligence effort.” The British investigators eventually received help
and cooperation from the United States and more than two-dozen
European countries.357 Within the first year, the investigators had taken
more than 12,500 witness statements, collected more than 26,000 physical
exhibits (of which more than 5,000 were subjected to forensic
examination), and reviewed more than 6,000 hours of video footage.358
Ultimately, the investigators interviewed more than 30,000 people and
collected 40,000 exhibits.359 No information was available on the number
of investigators involved or the duration of the investigation.
353. David Johnston, U.S. Hopes Arrest in Embassy Blasts Will Break Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/17/world/us-hopes-arrest-in-embassy-blasts-will-breakcase.html.
354. David Johnston, Bombings in East Africa; The Investigation; A Painstaking Search for
Answers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/world/bombings-in-eastafrica-the-investigation-a-painstaking-search-for-answers.html.
355. REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2006,
HC 1087, ¶ 74 (U.K.).
356. Id. ¶ 4.
357. See Elaine Sciolino & Don Van Natta Jr., With No Leads, British Consult Allies on Blasts,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2005), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9503E6DA123DF932
A25754C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted=all. See also Don Van Natta Jr. & Elaine Sciolino, Bombs in
London Are Now Called Military Quality, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2005) http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/07/12/world/europe/bombs-in-london-are-now-called-military-quality.html?mtrref=www.google.
com&gwh=7DBAB25B22BBF4E66359CE6F4F1A27E2&gwt=pay (noting cooperation with U.S. and
European authorities).
358. REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY 2005, 2006,
HC 1087, ¶ 74 (U.K.).
359. See Lady Justice Hallett, Concluding Remarks, Coroner's Inquests into the London
Bombings of 7 July 2005, Hearing Transcripts pp. 4–5, ll. 16–25 (May 6, 2011), http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120216072438/http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/hearing_ transcripts/
06052011am.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).
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6. Norway Attacks 2011
The investigation of Anders Breivik’s crimes took more than one year
and the crimes were investigated by a specially created task force
comprised of more than 100 investigators with specialties in evidence,
360
victims, witnesses, and international cooperation. In the first six weeks
after the attacks, the investigators interviewed more than 450 people with
361
The
further interviews expected as the investigation continued.
Norwegian authorities received assistance from the governments of the
U.S., Britain, and other Nordic countries.362
7. Crash of MH17 over Ukraine
While the victims of MH17 came from about a dozen countries, the
largest number of victims came from the Netherlands.363 Thus, the
Netherlands has led the investigation into the attack. Substantial assistance
has also come from Australia and Malaysia. The Dutch government
described the investigation of the crash of MH17 as “a highly complex
364
undertaking, which will take considerable time.” The team was led by
eight prosecutors from the Public Prosecution Service.365 They were
supported by an investigation team that consisted of “expert detectives
from a variety of backgrounds, including international crime, high-tech
crime, and forensics.”366 Investigation personnel also came from the Royal
367
Military and Border Police as well as the Aviation Police. Initially, the
368
Dutch sent forty police investigators to the scene of the crash. It appears

360. See Walter Gibbs & Elinor Schang, Norway Police To Track Killer’s Funds in Year-Long
Probe, REUTERS NOR. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/idINIndia-5860722
0110803. See also Aled-Dilwyn Fisher, Breivik police question ‘Fjordman’, NEWSINENGLISH.NO
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/08/04/breivik-police-question-fjordman/ (noting
that within two weeks of the attacks, there were already more than 100 Norwegian police officers
working on the investigation).
361. See John Price, Brievik investigation ‘could last several months’, The FOREIGNER (Aug. 30,
2011), http://theforeigner.no/pages/news/breivik-investigation-could-last-several-months/.
362. Gibbs & Schang, supra note 360.
363. See Clark & Kramer, supra note 247.
364. See Letter to the House of Representatives from Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans
Timmermans and Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert regarding the MH17 air disaster, 7
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/parliamentary-documents/
2014/10/27/letter-to-the-house-of-representatives-regarding-the-mh17-air-disaster/mh17-letter-201410-09.pdf.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See Scott Neuman, Australia Sending 190 Police to Secure MH17 Wreckage, NPR (July 25,
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this was later increased to ninety personnel onsite.369 In addition, 750
police investigators worked on the case in the Netherlands, bringing the
total number of Dutch investigators to 840.370
In addition to the Dutch investigators, Australia initially sent forty-five
371
investigators to the crime scene in Ukraine. This was later increased to
372
373
ninety personnel. It was then increased again to 190. Malaysia sent a
team of more than 130 investigators and forensic specialists to the crash
374
site. The examination of the human remains was conducted by a multinational team of more than 200 forensic specialists from Australia,
Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand, Indonesia, and
Malaysia.375
The investigation collected nearly 5 billion webpages, viewed more
than 500,000 photographs and videos, and listened to more than 150,000
telephone intercepts.376 Finally, the Dutch authorities recovered twelve
train cars of wreckage that were transported back to the Netherlands for
forensic analysis.377 The wreckage was “examined in detail, piece by
piece.”378 During the course of the investigation, the investigators made
2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/07/25/335189945/australia-sending-190-policeto-secure-mh17-wreckage; Tom Burridge, Dutch military police in Ukraine to investigate flight MH17,
BBC NEWS (July 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28506109.
369. See 840 Dutch police officers are involved in MH17 crash investigation, DUTCHNEWS.NL
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/08/840_dutch_police_officers_are/.
370. Id.; see also Binnenland, 840 agenten werken aan MH17, NOS (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://nos.nl/artikel/681783-840-agenten-werken-aan-mh17.html.
371. See Kristin Shorten, Australian Federal Police join international investigation into MH17,
NEWS.COM.AU (July 22, 2014), http://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-updates/australian-federalpolice-join-international-investigation-into-mh17/story-fnizu68q-1226997936671.
372. See Armed Australian soldiers, police deploy to MH17 crash site, RT NEWS (July 25, 2014),
http://rt.com/news/175444-armed-police-ukraine-mh17/.
373. See Neuman, supra note 368.
374. See MH17 plane crash: Dutch experts examine bodies, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28399406.
375. See FAW Special Operations Flight MH17, https://www.politie.nl/en/themes/qa-flightmh17.html. Of these, 120 were Dutch and the remaining eighty were from other countries. Id.
376. Somini Sengupta & Andrew E. Kramer, Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in
Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016); Presentation Preliminary Results
Criminal Investigation MH17, OM.NL (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17vliegramp/presentaties/presentation-joint/.
377. See Letter of 17 December 2014 from the Minister of Security and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders, and Minister of Defense Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert to the
President of the House of Representatives concerning the current state of affairs with regard to the
MH16 air disaster 1 (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/
parliamentary-documents/2014/12/23/letter-about-the-current-state-of-affairs-with-regard-to-the-mh 17disaster/ju113980.pdf.
378. See Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17, supra note 376.
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sixty requests for legal assistance to more than twenty countries.379 In the
first five months of the investigation alone, the Dutch government spent
380
more than €36 million.
8. Paris Attacks 2015
The investigation covers both Paris, where the attacks took place, and a
suburb of Brussels, where some of the attackers appear to have been
381
from. In the first week after the attacks, the French police carried out
382
793 raids and arrested 107 people as a result of the investigation. By the
end of the second week, French authorities had conducted more than 1,200
raids.383 More than 10,000 police officers were deployed to carry out the
384
Belgian police also carried out numerous raids in and around
raids.
Brussels.385 The French Parliament also passed a law to assist in the
investigation, which permitted the French authorities to make warrantless
searches, engage in more aggressive interrogation of individuals, and place
people under house arrest without judicial intervention.386 There was
considerable international cooperation with the French investigation, with
the French authorities being assisted by the Belgian, German, and Turkish
387
authorities.

379. Id.
380. See Ingrid Grindstad, Over 36M Spent on MH17 Investigation So Far, NLTIMES.NL (Nov.
21, 2014), http://www.nltimes.nl/2014/11/21/e36m-spent-mh17-investigation-far/.
381. See Paris attacks: The investigation so far, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-34822265.
382. Id.
383. See Latest on the investigation into the November attacks in Paris, RFI (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.english.rfi.fr/france/20151125-latest-developments-going-investigation-paris-attacks.
384. See Adam Nossiter, Paris Attacks Spur Emergency Edict and Intense Policing in France,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/world/europe/in-france-some-seethe-police-security-net-as-too-harsh-paris-attacks.html.
385. See Andrew Higgins & Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, 16 Arrests in Belgium Terrorism Raids,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/europe/brussels-remains-onhighest-alert-level-as-manhunts-expand.html.
386. See Nossiter, supra note 384.
387. See supra note 381; see also Michael Safi et al., Paris attacks: investigation spreads across
Europe as terrorist identified, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/nov/15/paris-attacks-investigation-spreads-across-europe-as-terrorist-identified.
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C. Comparing the ICC’s Resources to Domestic Resources
This section compares domestic investigations to the ICC’s
investigations by the number of personnel assigned to the investigation at
its peak, the number of witnesses interviewed during the course of the
investigation, and the number of pieces of evidence collected during the
investigation. While it was not possible to find information on each of
these variables for every domestic investigation, information on at least
two of the variables was found for six of the eight domestic investigations,
and all eight had information on at least one of them. The information on
domestic mass atrocity investigations is summarized below in Table 4. All
the information discussed in this Section comes from the data in Table 4
unless otherwise indicated. For comparison purposes, the ICC’s
investigative resources are summarized in the right-hand column of Table
4. As noted above, the ICC expects that an average investigation team will
have about thirty-five personnel at peak size and that an average
investigation will screen around 350 potential witnesses, take about 170
388
witness statements, and collect about 20,000 other pieces of evidence.
TABLE 4: INVESTIGATIVE RESOURCES IN DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS389
Lockerbie

WTC

OK
City

Embassies

Peak
personnel

1,500

More than
700

More
than
2,600

More than
900

Number of
witness
interviews

10,000

Unknown

28,000

Unknown

Tens of
thousands

Unknown

More
than 1
billion

Unknown

Pieces of
evidence
collected

London

Norway

MH17

Paris

ICC

More
than
1,300

More than
10,000

35

30,000

More than Unknown Unknown
450

170

40,000

Unknown

Unknown More than
100

More
than 5
billion

Unknown 20,000

Comparing the ICC’s investigations to the domestic investigations
shows that all but one of the domestic investigations discussed in this
Article had vastly more resources than the ICC’s investigations. The
investigation of Anders Breivik in Norway is something of an outlier and
will be discussed separately. All of the other domestic mass atrocity
investigations had tens to hundreds of times more resources than the ICC.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 291–300, 310–16.
389. The data in this table comes from Parts IV.B.1 to IV.B.8 above, except for the data on the
ICC, which comes from Table 3.
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The Breivik investigation looks quite different from the other domestic
mass atrocity investigations. More than 100 investigators worked on the
case. This is still three times the number assigned to the average ICC
investigation, but significantly fewer than in any of the other domestic
investigations. The Norwegian investigators conducted at least 450
interviews. This is two and a half times as many interviews as the average
ICC investigation but much less than any of the other domestic
390
There is no information on how many pieces of noninvestigations.
testimonial evidence the Breivik investigation collected.
The Breivik investigation looks like it had about three times as many
resources as the average ICC investigation, but it is not fair to compare the
Breivik investigation to the average ICC investigation for several reasons.
First, the Breivik investigation involved a single perpetrator, just two
crime sites, and a much smaller number of victims than the average ICC
investigation. It was a crime of significantly lower gravity than what the
ICC typically investigates.391 Second, it had a number of features that
simplified the investigation. For example, the perpetrator was captured
right away392 and left behind a detailed manifesto outlining his actions.393
He also readily confessed.394 In short, it was a crime of significantly lower
gravity and investigative complexity than the ICC typically faces. As a
result, one would expect it to consume significantly fewer resources. Thus,
comparing the Breivik investigation to the average ICC investigation is
inappropriate.
Focusing on the domestic investigations that are comparable to the
ICC’s investigations, it appears that those domestic investigations had at
least ten and sometimes more than one hundred times the resources of the
average ICC investigation. Starting with the peak number of personnel
assigned to the investigation, the smallest investigation (the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing) had at least 700 people working on it at its peak.
The largest investigation (the Paris attacks) had more than 10,000 people
390. On the other hand, this particular comparison may be misleading. The Norwegian
investigators took 450 witness statements in the first six weeks of the investigation. See Price, supra
note 361. We do not know the total number of statements they took during the entire yearlong
investigation, and the final figure may have been considerably larger than 450.
391. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the gravity of a typical ICC investigation).
392. See Elisa Mala & J. David Goodman, At Least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23oslo.html (noting that Anders
Breivik had been arrested on the same day as the violence).
393. See Steven Erlanger & Scott Shane, As Horrors Emerge, Norway Charges Christian
Extremist, N.Y. TIMES A1 (July 24, 2011).
394. See Steven Erlanger, Amid Tears, Flickering Candles and Flowers, a Shaken Norway
Mourns, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/world/europe/25oslo.html.
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working on it. This is anywhere from twenty to three hundred and thirty
times more personnel than the ICC has for its investigations. Moreover, it
is important to note that the figures for domestic investigators represent
minimums and the actual number of investigators involved might be
significantly higher than Table 4 suggests. For example, information on
the U.S. investigations only includes data on the number of FBI personnel
involved even though we know that numerous other U.S. law enforcement
agencies contributed personnel to the investigations.395 There is a huge
disparity in the number of personnel available in domestic and
international investigations.
Looking next at the number of interviews undertaken during the
investigation, the numbers range from 10,000 on the low end in the
Lockerbie investigation to 30,000 in the London bombings investigation.
This corresponds to between fifty-five and one hundred and seventy-five
times as many interviews as the ICC anticipates taking during an average
investigation. This is an enormous difference. At the rate of 170 interviews
every three years (the typical pace for an ICC investigation),396 the ICC
would take more than 150 years to conduct the same number of interviews
as were conducted just during the Lockerbie investigation.
Finally, there is more variability in the number of pieces of evidence
collected during the investigations. On the one hand, the Lockerbie and
London bombings investigations reported collecting tens of thousands of
pieces of evidence. This exceeds what the ICC anticipates collecting
during a typical investigation, but not by a huge amount. On the other
hand, the World Trade Center investigation and the MH17 investigation
both reported collecting billions of pieces of evidence. The latter two
investigations collected thousands of times more evidence than the ICC
anticipates collecting.
Even though the data is incomplete—there are a number of boxes in
Table 4 for which there is no available information—the results are still
clear. Leaving aside the Breivik investigation, all of the other domestic
mass atrocity investigations in this study had vastly more resources than
the ICC’s average investigation. The evidence suggests that these
domestic investigations have had at least ten times as many resources as
the average ICC investigation and sometimes more than one hundred
times as many resources. This is an enormous difference, particularly
given that the ICC investigates crimes that are more grave and difficult to
395. See supra text accompanying notes 335–37, 338, 348.
396. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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complete successfully than those investigated by states.397 This strongly
suggests that the ICC is under-resourced and that it should have more
resources given the gravity and investigative difficulty of the crimes
before the Court.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There is an ongoing debate between states and the ICC over whether
the Court has sufficient resources.398 This Article sheds light on that
question by comparing the court’s investigations to comparable
investigations carried out by states. The first and most important
conclusion of this Article is that the ICC is enormously under-resourced
compared to domestic mass atrocity investigations in Western Europe and
the United States. The ICC tackles investigations that are greater in gravity
and difficulty than even the most serious domestic mass atrocity
investigations.399 As terrible as the domestic crimes described in this
Article are, the ICC regularly investigates situations with more victims of
all types.400 Its investigations also involve larger numbers of perpetrator
groups, more crime sites, and crimes that take place over a much longer
period of time.401 They also tend to involve acts of exceptional brutality
and have a larger impact on the societies where they take place.402 As a
result of the greater gravity and difficulty of the ICC investigations, they
require greater investigative resources than the domestic investigations
described in this Article.403
Yet, the ICC has vastly fewer resources than most domestic mass
atrocity investigations. The ICC’s investigative teams peak at thirty-five
personnel, of which only thirteen are actual investigators.404 In contrast,
states regularly assign a thousand or more personnel to the most serious
domestic crimes. For example, more than 1,500 personnel worked on the
Lockerbie investigation, more than 2,600 worked on the Oklahoma City
bombing, and more than 1,300 worked on the MH17 crash
investigation.405 In many cases, the actual numbers of investigators
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See discussion supra Part III.D.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–6.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See supra Table 4.
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assigned to the domestic investigations may well be higher than these
numbers suggest.406 Domestic investigations also regularly interview tens
of thousands of witnesses, compared to just 170 for the ICC. For example,
more than 10,000 witnesses were interviewed during the Lockerbie
investigation, 28,000 were interviewed during the Oklahoma City
investigation, and more than 30,000 were interviewed during the London
investigation.407 Ultimately, domestic mass atrocity investigations in the
United States and Western Europe usually have tens to hundreds of times
more resources available to them than the average ICC investigation,
despite being intrinsically less difficult investigations.408 This shows that
the ICC does not have sufficient resources to conduct the extremely
difficult investigations it is tasked with completing.
This Article’s second conclusion is that the ICC’s relative lack of
resources is partly to blame for some of the difficulties it has faced. The
ICC has been less effective than was expected.409 There are many reasons
for this, but one of the most important is that it does not have the resources
to conduct the kind of investigations that are necessary to respond to mass
atrocity crimes.410 To put it bluntly, it appears that several early cases
411
were compromised by the lack of investigative resources. Of course, the
lack of resources is not the only cause of the ICC’s difficulties. It appears
406. For example, we know only the number of FBI agents assigned to the World Trade Center,
Oklahoma City and Embassy bombing investigations, but each of these investigations was a joint
investigation with other agencies. We do not know how many personnel from these other agencies
participated in the investigations. See supra text accompanying notes 335–37, 338, 348. Thus, it seems
certain that the figures shown in Table 4 undercount the actual number of investigators assigned to
those investigations.
407. See supra Table 4.
408. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
409. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that “the OTP has not to date had the successes it
had hoped for or expected”); Dermot Groome, No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct
and Quality of ICC Investigations, 3 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 1, 1–3 (2014).
410. See Dermot Groome et al., Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International
Criminal Court, 62–63 (Dec. 2014), https://dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/Groome-ICCExpert-Report-Dec-2-2014.pdf (noting that some of the problems that gave rise to flawed
investigations at the ICC stemmed from “a lack of sufficient capacity to investigate these complex
crimes” and concluding that the OTP “appears to lack the resources it needs to adequately investigate
situations to the high standard required”).
411. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT ¶ 17-18 (2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf (noting that
the OTP lacked the resources to fully staff its investigations and that the judges had indicated that they
expected the OTP to develop “a more substantial range of evidence in its cases”); Id. ¶ 23 (noting that
the OTP will try to “expand and diversify its collection of evidence so as to meet the expectations of
Chambers”). See also Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that some of the ICC’s judges were
concerned that the ICC’s cases were not strong enough and that they relied on “undeveloped
evidence”).
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that the OTP also made some strategic mistakes in its early investigations
which undermined several of its cases,412 but the OTP has made changes
in recent years to improve its investigative technique to address many of
413
these problems. The resource deficit, however, persists.
In contrast, the domestic mass atrocity investigations described in this
Article had the resources to conduct extremely thorough investigations.414
Moreover, most of the domestic mass atrocity investigations described in
this Article can probably be described as successful in the sense that they
succeeded in identifying and bringing to justice many of those responsible
415
But this success is due, at least in part, to the
for the atrocities.
enormous resources allocated to those investigations. They have been able
to follow every lead, question every potential witness, and collect every
piece of evidence.416 The ICC’s investigations, in comparison, are much

412. See generally Groome, supra note 409. See also Groome et al., supra note 410, at 52–61
(describing various shortcomings in the ICC’s investigations).
413. See Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
¶ 1, 13 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/070715-OTP_Strategic_Plan_2016-2018.pdf (noting
that a switch from “focused” investigations to “open-ended, in-depth investigations” had improved the
quality of ICC investigations as indicated by the rate at which the Pre-Trial Chamber had confirmed
charges).
414. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the resources available in domestic mass atrocity
investigations).
415. For example, the United States has been quite successful in investigating and prosecuting
those responsible for mass atrocity crimes. See Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and
Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, DOJ (June 9, 2009), http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-prosecuting-and-detaining-terror-suspects-us-criminal-justice-system;
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, TRYING TERROR SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL COURTS, (2016), https://www.human
rightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USLS-Fact-Sheet-Courts.pdf (noting that U.S. courts have
successfully prosecuted almost 500 individuals for terrorism-related charges since the September 11th
attacks); Phil Hirschkorn, Another Successful Terrorism Trial Inside the US, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 27,
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/20504/successful-terrorism-trial-us-bin-ladens-man-london-facinglife-prison/ (noting that the US was able to successfully prosecute those responsible for the East
African embassy bombings); Matt Apuzzo, A Holder Legacy: Shifting Terror Cases to the Civilian
Courts, and Winning, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/us/a-holderlegacy-shifting-terror-cases-to-the-courts-and-winning.html. The United Kingdom also appears to have
been relatively successful in investigating and prosecuting such crimes. See MI5, Arrests and
Convictions, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/internationalterrorism/arrests-and-convictions.html (last visited Sep. 17, 2016).
416. See supra text accompanying note 345 (noting that domestic investigations have been able to
“leave no stone unturned” in investigating mass atrocity crimes). In other examples, President Clinton,
in the aftermath of the U.S. Embassy bombings, vowed to “use all means at our disposal to bring those
responsible to justice no matter what or how long it takes.” See Philip Shenon, Bombings in East
Africa: In Washington; Focus on Suspects in Past Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/08/world/bombings-in-east-africa-in-washington-focus-on-suspectsin-past-attacks.html. After the London train bombings, Prime Minister Tony Blair promised that
“[t]here will of course now be the most intense police and security service action to make sure that we
bring those responsible to justice.” See Associated Press, Blair delivers a classically British rallying
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different. The average ICC investigation will only have a total of thirteen
investigators and will only take about 170 witness statements.417 The ICC
investigators cannot hope to follow every lead or talk to every potential
witness. The resulting investigations are surely weaker than they would
have been if the ICC had the same resources as comparable domestic
418
Thus, it appears that the ICC’s lack of resources is at
investigations.
least partly to blame for its relative lack of success.
This Article’s third conclusion relates to the role of international
cooperation in the success of mass atrocity investigations. One of the
419
The ICC is
obstacles the ICC faces is a lack of state cooperation.
weaker than any state, even states like Sudan that have been largely
ostracized by the international community.420 Due to the absence of strong
international support, Sudan has been able to effectively stonewall the
ICC.421 As a result, the ICC has publicly acknowledged that it is unable to
successfully investigate or prosecute crimes committed in Darfur without
international support.422 The ICC’s experience in Sudan demonstrates that
the Court cannot succeed unless states that support it apply pressure on
recalcitrant states.423 This conclusion is reinforced by the study of
domestic mass atrocity investigations contained in this Article.
A prominent feature of the domestic investigations discussed in this
Article is the importance of state cooperation for the success of mass
atrocity investigations. For example, the Lockerbie investigation relied
upon cooperation from the U.S., French, Swiss, and German authorities.424
The U.S. Embassy bombings investigation relied upon cooperation from
Kenya and Tanzania for access to the crime sites. The British investigation
of the London train bombings relied upon cooperation from the United
425
States and more than two dozen European countries.
The Norwegian
investigation of Anders Breivik relied upon cooperation from the U.S.,
cry, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/8502984/ns/world_news-attacks_on_
london/t/blair-delivers-classically-british-rallying-cry/#.Vk-cGHarTcs.
417. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
418. See Whiting, supra note 274, at 164 (noting that “the OTP may never be able to conduct
investigations that are as comprehensive as what can be done in a national jurisdiction”).
419. See supra text accompanying note 278.
420. See Stuart Ford, The ICC and the Security Council: How Much Support Is There For Ending
Impunity?, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 62–63 (2016).
421. Id. at 38.
422. Id. at 34.
423. Id. at 63–64.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 331–32.
425. See supra text accompanying note 357.
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Britain, and other Nordic countries.426 The MH17 crash investigation
required close cooperation between investigators from the Netherlands,
Australia, and Malaysia.427 In addition, these three countries received
support and cooperation from Germany, Belgium, New Zealand, Indonesia
and many other countries.428 The investigators were also dependent on
cooperation from both Ukraine and the Ukrainian rebels for access to the
crime scene. Russia’s refusal to cooperate, on the other hand, has made the
MH17 crash investigation much harder.429 Finally, the French
investigation of the Paris attacks received cooperation from Belgian,
430
German, and Turkish authorities.
As these examples show, international cooperation is vital to the
success of mass atrocity investigations, whether they are domestic or
international. While domestic investigations were generally able to secure
the cooperation of other states, the ICC has had difficulty securing state
cooperation. The inability to secure state cooperation is another reason the
ICC has been less successful than domestic mass atrocity investigations.
This Article’s fourth and final conclusion is that the ICC’s investigative
resources should be significantly increased because that will improve the
Court’s outcomes. The ICC is under-resourced which is at least partly to
blame for its lack of success. Moreover, the comparison between domestic
and international investigations suggests that the ICC would be more
successful if it had the resources to conduct investigations more like those
carried out in response to domestic mass atrocity crimes. This leads to the
conclusion that significantly increasing the ICC’s investigative resources
would improve the ICC’s success.
Moreover, by focusing on the question of success it may be possible to
convince the members of the Assembly of States Parties to support an
increase in the ICC’s resources. First, there is broad support for the
426. See supra text accompanying note 362.
427. See supra Part IV.B.7.
428. See supra text accompanying note 375.
429. For example, the Russian government has consistently denied that a missile caused the crash
and offered its own “evidence” to support this claim. See Sengupta & Kramer, supra note 376. This
has forced the MH17 investigation team to spend considerable time investigating and ruling out these
alternative theories. See Presentation Preliminary Results Criminal Investigation MH17, supra note
376 (noting that alternative theories needed to be carefully investigated so that if defendants presented
them in court the prosecution would be ready to “demonstrate that they did not take place”). The
Russian government also refused to provide relevant information in its custody to the investigation.
See Sengupta & Kramer, supra note 376 (noting that the Russian government had refused to provide
radar data despite being asked to do so).
430. See supra text accompanying note 387.
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success of the ICC within the international community.431 Most states
agree that there should be an end to impunity and that the ICC represents
one of the international community’s signature initiatives to end
432
impunity. There are 124 state parties to the Rome Statute433 and support
for the ICC exists on virtually every continent, including Europe, Central
434
America, South America, and Africa. Even Russia and China, the two
states who have done the most to block support for the ICC at the
international level, agree in principle that the Court should be
435
successful.
Second, states are rational actors who make decisions on whether to
create or become members of international organizations based on a
calculation of costs and benefits.436 Thus, an economic argument may be
more persuasive for member states than a moral one. The ICC was
established to achieve certain goals.437 States pay for the ICC with the
expectation that it will be successful in achieving these goals.438 They
want the ICC to be successful in achieving these goals.439 By increasing
the ICC’s investigative resources, states can improve the Court’s
likelihood of success and thereby derive greater benefit from membership
in the Court. Thus, by focusing on the relationship between investigative
resources and success, it may be possible to convince states that increasing
the ICC’s investigative resources is in their own interests.
431. See generally Ford, supra note 420.
432. Id. at 45–50.
433. See The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20stat
ute.aspx (last visited Sept. 2016).
434. Id.
435. Id. at 53–55.
436. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 6 (1998) (“We assume, for simplicity, that states are the
principal actors in world politics and that they use IOs to create social orderings appropriate to their
pursuit of shared goals . . . . We start with the pursuit of efficiency and employ the logic of transaction
costs economics and rational choice . . . .”); Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of
International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORGS. 761, 762 (2001) (“Our basic presumption, grounded in the
broad tradition of rational-choice analysis, is that states use international institutions to further their
own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”) (emphasis in original).
437. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 28, Preamble (arguing that the court would lead to the
“effective prosecution” of the “most serious crimes of concern to the international community,” “put
an end to impunity,” and “contribute to the prevention of such crimes”).
438. See Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 230 (2012) (arguing that states support international courts so that
they can be successful in achieving their institutional goals).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 431–35.
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